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THE IMPACT OF MEDICAID MANAGED CARE ON THE LIVES OF THE 
CHRONICALLY MENTALLY ILL IN SAN FRANCISCO. 
Deborah P. Steinbaum (Sponsored by Mark Schlesinger). Department of Epidemiology 
and Public Health, Yale University School of Medicine, New Haven, CT. 
The changing treatment patterns of 154 severely mentally ill individuals were 
tracked over a five-year period just before and during San Francisco’s transition to 
Medicaid managed care to determine the effects of implementation of Medicaid 
managed care on a chronically mentally ill population. Sources of information included 
INSYST (a billing/records database), “Bed Committee ” records,and departmental 
memos and reports. Tests of statistical significance were conducted using an 
independent sampling design. 
The proportion of clients using acute services decreased from 65.9% in 1994 to 
41.8% in 1998 and the proportion of clients in semi-permanent care increased from 
11.0% in 1994 to 52.5% in 1998, indicating that managed care is shifting the San 
Francisco mental health system’s focus from crisis management to long-term, chronic 
care. Both of these changes were statistically significant (p<0.000) as was a decrease in 
the proportion of clients using intermediate level services was also statistically 
significant. By 1998, significantly higher proportions of clients in assertive community 
treatment (ACT) plans used acute and intermediate level services than did their non-ACT 
counterparts; thus, even with an ACT intervention, they were less able to maintain 
stability in the community. Substance abusers used similar amounts of care when 
compared to non-users except in the last year of the study, when they were significantly 
less likely to need acute care. This was largely due to a decrease in emergency room 
usage, which may represent the beginning of a shift in patient attitudes. 
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Introduction 
Every day, approximately 30% of the United States requires some form of 
mental health care. Of these people, only a small proportion is considered to be 
severely mentally ill or, in the case of children, seriously emotionally disturbed 
(SMI/SED). *' The severely mentally ill are defined as those people so incapacitated 
by their psychiatric disease that they are unable to function normally in mainstream 
society, even with extra support services. They use an inordinate amount of the 
resources devoted to mental health and health care in general. The case of 
schizophrenia is particularly striking - schizophrenics, who account for only 1 % of 
the general population, consume 2.5 % of the nation's health care expenditures. As of 
1990, public expenditures on mental health services in the United States amounted to 
over 20 billion dollars per year.2 
The public health system's expenses are so high because they pay for a 
majority of the health care received by the country's mentally ill. Since few of the 
SMI are capable of unsupported employment, their needs are usually met by federal, 
state, and local government programs; it is estimated that approximately 2/3 of their 
expenditures are paid for by these programs.3 Most mental and physical health 
services are provided through Medicare, Medicaid, and community mental health 
programs, but other programs cover such arenas as housing, substance abuse, and 
financial assistance. 
* There are no firm numbers of the amount of SMI/SED in the population, given the fragmented nature of current 
systems of care and individual variation in disease patterns. In 1990, the prevalence of mental illness per 10,000 
people was estimated to be 96.0 for schizophrenia, 72.0 for bipolar disorder, and 447.0 for major depression. 

In the current era of managed care, the expenditures incurred by the SM1/SED 
population have been the focus of recent cost-cutting measures. This represents the 
confluence of two major trends, and thus marks a watershed moment for mental 
health care. The first trend is the continual reduction of services for the mentally ill 
since deinstitutionalization began in the early 1960's. The second, and more recent, 
trend is the national shift to managed care resulting from the skyrocketing health care 
costs of the 1980's. 
Medicaid managed care is fairly new to the field of mental health, and in the 
information void of the early 1990's, each state developed somewhat different 
strategies for administration and organization of their programs. The state of 
California began to plan for implementation of Medicaid managed care in 1991, 
ultimately choosing to devolve responsibility for the program to each of the states' 58 
counties. This study examines the impact of changes made in the provision of mental 
health care in the city and county of San Francisco. It does so by examining the lives 
of the city's severely mentally ill in the period just before and during the first few 
years of managed mental health care, from 1994 to 1998. 
San Francisco as a Case Study 
San Francisco is one of the most unique cities in the United States, containing 
a wealth of ethnic and cultural diversity, a mild climate, and one of the most liberal 
populaces in the county. It is both a city and county, with a population of 
approximately 778,000 residents, 2/3 of whom are adults between the ages of 20 and 
64.4 No one ethnic group dominates the population - whites represent 43%, 
Asian/Pacific Islanders 32%, Latinos 15%, and African Americans 10%.5 

San Francisco is also notable for its claim to some of the highest rates of 
mental illness in the state of California for reasons that remain unclear. For example, 
schizophrenia, which has a statewide prevalence of 96.0 per 10,000 people, has a 
prevalence in San Francisco of 8.1 per 10,000 people. Rates of bipolar disorder show 
an even greater disparity between San Francisco and the rest of the state: the illness 
has a statewide prevalence of 72.0 per 10,000 compared to a prevalence of 114.3 per 
10,000 in San Francisco.6 Other studies have cited even higher rates for the city when 
compared with the rest of California.7 Another indicator of mental health, the city's 
suicide rate, is also quite high. In fact, San Francisco has the highest suicide rate of all 
of California's urban counties.8* 
The branch of the public health department responsible for mental health, the 
Division of Mental Health and Substance Abuse (DMS), clearly is serving a 
population with a significant amount of pathology. Furthermore, this population has 
been steadily increasing in size over the past several years.9 In 1997-1998, DMS 
served 19,117 clients, in 1996 - 1997, DMS served 17,497 clients, and in 1991-1992, 
it served 16,100 clients.1011 Over a six-year period, the population served therefore 
increased by 18%. The majority of the department's clientele, 65%, is funded by 
MediCal, while the remainder is funded by Medicare (16%) or has no insurance 
(16%).12 
This differs from the city's overall insurance picture, which is dominated by a 
large population of uninsured people. Approximately 120,000 of the city's residents 
are MediCal recipients, while 150,000 are uninsured or underinsured. Of the MediCal 
* San Francisco has a suicide rate of 15.7/100,000 versus the state's rate of 11.2/100,000. 
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recipients, only 28,000 receive aid on the basis of a disability, and of these people, 
approximately 13,000 are disabled by mental illness. 
Several characteristics of the city make it a particularly interesting place to 
study the lives of the mentally ill, the most striking of which is its huge population of 
homeless people. A 1991 study found that San Francisco was second only to 
Washington, DC in terms of homelessness per capita.13* In FY 1993 - 1994. an 
estimated 4300 people were homeless each night, and 11,000 to 16,000 were 
homeless at some point in the year.14 Approximately 9500 people were turned away 
from the city's shelters each month because the shelters were filled to capacity.15 The 
situation is particularly bad in San Francisco because the city has one of the tightest 
housing markets in the country. Rents have increased drastically over the past two 
decades, as gentrification has swept through formerly low-income neighborhoods. 
For example, between 1978 and 1998, rents for the cheapest rooms increased by 
166%, a rate 30% faster than that at which incomes increased, while simultaneously, 
the supply of low income housing dropped precipitously, with the supply of SRO 
hotel rooms dropping by 40%.16 
San Francisco also has a large population of substance abusers. Its publicly 
funded substance abuse programs served 12,000 clients in 1996 - 1997; unfortunately, 
even this many treatment slots could not accommodate treatment on demand for all 
that needed it. Several markers of drug and alcohol abuse indicate that San 
Francisco's problem is one of massive proportions. It recently had the highest rate of 
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drug related emergency room visits in the country, and from 1991 through 1993 had 
the distinction of leading California in drug related deaths, with a death rate 2 V2 
times that of the rest of the state.1' 
The confluence of homelessness, substance abuse, and mental illness creates a 
treatment quagmire, where each of these problems is worsened by association with 
the others. Dual diagnosis rates among the severely mentally ill are quite high in the 
city, reaching 70% to 74% in studies of acutely ill individuals.18 
The Evolution of Managed Care in San Francisco 
Managed Care 
There is no standardized definition of "managed care." In general, it is viewed 
as a tool for organizing the provision of health care to populations. It aims to 
streamline services by simplifying points of entry into the health care system (for 
example, through a primary care provider), to better coordinate all aspects of a 
patient's care by centralizing authorization, and to control costs by reducing 
unnecessary and redundant services. Ideally, the latter goal is accomplished by 
devoting more resources to preventive services and alternatives to costly 
hospitalizations. Finally, managed care, with its focus on increased accountability and 
outcomes, theoretically acts as a means toward improving data collection and 
analysis. 
* San Francisco had 7.69 homeless per 1000 people. Washington, DC had 7.93 per 1000 people. No other cities' 
homeless rates were anywhere near these numbers, which are probably underestimates since they were derived 
from the 1990 census, a study whose methodology tends to undercount homeless and poor people. 
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Recently, government and industry have employed managed care primarily as 
a means to control rapidly rising health care costs. Between 1960 and 1990, American 
health care expenditures grew at a rate double that of the rest of the nation’s economy. 
In the early 1990’s, fears about recession, downsizing, and the growth of the 
uninsured population propelled both the public and private sectors to look for new 
ways to control health care costs. Nationally, the Clinton administration attempted to 
construct a universal health plan in 1993; when this model failed in 1994, reforms 
became fragmented, with momentum shifting to the realm of individual states and 
independent businesses. By 1995, 54 million Americans were members of HMO's 
and 130 million were enrolled in some form of managed care.19 
The arena of mental health was not spared these rapid changes. Between 1992 
and 1994, the number of Americans in managed behavioral health plans increased 
38% from 78 to 108 million. By 1995, 58% of the population was in a managed 
mental health plan.20 
For the chronically mentally ill, most of whom receive health care funded by 
the government, the impact of this shift was felt only when Medicaid programs 
switched to managed care models. Medicaid managed care is a relatively new 
phenomenon, growing rapidly over the past few years. Between 1993 and 1994, the 
number of Medicaid clients in managed care doubled, to 7.8 million people.21 Since 
each state is responsible for administering its own Medicaid program, the 
development of Medicaid managed care has occurred in a piecemeal fashion, with 
each state using a somewhat different model. 
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The state of California began to officially plan for implementation of 
Medicaid managed care, in 1991, with the passage of a bill mandating that Medicaid 
programs "arrange and encourage access to health care through entry to organized 
managed care plans of the type available to the general public."22 The state gave 
primary responsibility for managing Medicaid, known as MediCal in California, to 
the counties - each county in the state became responsible for delivering and/or 
brokering any MediCal services provided to those clients who were residents of their 
county. In 1992, CA Senate Bill 485 expanded the purview of MediCal managed 
care, and in 1994, Assembly Bill 757 established a separate managed care plan for 
mental health.23 
Mental health and substance abuse were to be "carved-ouf' of the rest of the 
MediCal package, with a separate administration and budget. Each county was to 
have a single mental health plan, and county public health officials were given the 
right of first refusal - the choice of whether to run their own plan or to have the state 
contract it out. State officials felt that a carve-out would serve California's SMI best 
by helping to maintain community health centers and eliminating the risk of selection 
bias. The single plan model for mental health therefore was in deliberate contrast to 
MediCal's "two plan model" for physical health, where each county was required to 
have two competing plans. 
Mental health managed care was to be phased in over time. The initial step 
was inpatient consolidation, consolidation of the two MediCal funding streams into 
one pot that would now be managed by the county. This would be followed several 
years later by outpatient consolidation, after which capitation would occur. The 
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projected date at which these latter two events were to occur changed several times. 
At the time of this writing, inpatient and outpatient consolidation have both occurred, 
inpatient on Jan 1, 1995 and outpatient on April 1, 1998; capitation currently is 
scheduled for July 1, 1999. This paper thus examines the period in San Francisco 
history from the year prior to inpatient consolidation to the first three months of 
outpatient consolidation. 
Other States* Experiences 
Expectations are that managed care will shift the focus of mental health 
services from an acute, crisis-oriented model to one stressing stable, long-term care. 
This makes financial sense, as acute care, such as use of emergency rooms and 
inpatient services, is much more expensive than rehabilitative services, such as 
residential care and vocational rehabilitation. The shift in focus also makes sense 
clinically, as it would improve the overall status of the patients, enabling them to 
achieve stability in their outside lives. This, in turn, could help to break the cycle of 
homelessness and instability that often causes debilitating secondary symptoms like 
depression and anxiety. Finally, from a societal perspective, the shift in focus could 
help to alleviate public problems such as the commission of misdemeanor crimes by 
homeless mentally ill individuals and the subsequent use of prisons to house these 
people. 
Other state Medicaid mental health programs seem to have met at least some 
of these goals. The most widely studied system is that of Massachusetts, which 
carved out mental health and substance abuse services and contracted them out to a 
private, for profit behavioral health care firm. The firm reduced costs substantially 
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within the first year, achieving savings of approximately 22%.24 In addition, over the 
first three years, the likelihood of an inpatient admission was reduced from 29% to 
24%, average inpatient stay was reduced by 3.3 days, and total cost per patient was 
slightly reduced. Since use of community services was not measured, nor was the 
extent of cost shifting estimated, only limited conclusions can be drawn about the 
impact of the new system upon overall mental health care. Reduction of costs was 
partly due to the diminished use of inpatient resources, but was mostly due to lower 
negotiated fees for inpatient services.2'2b In addition, Massachusetts may be difficult 
to use as a standard of comparison, since the state spends more per capita on 
Medicaid than most other states and thus may have more room for budget cuts. For 
example, whereas Massachusetts ranks third in the nation in overall Medicaid 
spending per person in poverty, California ranks 49th.27,28 
Comparison of traditional fee-for-service Medicaid with prepaid Medicaid 
mental health care has been attempted in studies of several other states, none of which 
examined outcomes over more than a one to two year period. Most studies found that 
prepaid care resulted in a reduction of inpatient usage, but the magnitude of this 
reduction varied greatly. Changes in outpatient usage followed no predictable pattern, 
and substance abuse was treated no more and often much less than in a fee-for-service 
environment. Of particular note was the fact that the longer-term studies found that 
global functioning of schizophrenics may decrease with more time in prepaid care.29 
Unfortunately, few of the studies followed patients for longer than a year, the amount 
of time that was needed for this difference to become significant. 
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The most troubling outcome seen in Medicaid managed mental health 
occurred in Tennessee, where the TennCare Partners Plan actually came under federal 
investigation for failing to fulfill its contractual obligations to the citizens of the state. 
The plan was doomed from the start due to flaws in its design. It did not 
designate a target population, and the SMI were thus lumped into the general 
population to compete for a finite body of resources. In addition, since the capitated 
rates set by the state were the same for all Medicaid clients, with no adjustments for 
severity of disease, taking on SMI clients became a liability to clinicians. Finally, 
since the plan was a carveout, but did not clearly delineate lines of responsibility 
between physical and mental health practitioners, minimal oversight and a lack of 
accountability were inevitable. 
Many mentally ill patients suffered as a consequence of these changes and 
even dropped out of the mental health system. Community mental health centers, the 
traditional care providers for the SMI, were forced to shut down, and consequently, 
long term, productive relationships were terminated. Within one year, Tennessee saw 
a 15% decrease in mental health and substance abuse services.30 A leading researcher 
concluded that "TennCare Partners serves as a warning to other states that 
privatization of Medicaid-funded behavioral health care, in and of itself, may not 
improve service delivery or decrease costs."31 
Expectations of the San Francisco Model 
San Francisco differs from the above cases in several important ways. As a 
county-based system, it covers a much smaller population and geographic area than 
did the statewide programs, and as a public system, it is theoretically more invested in 

eliminating cost shifting than private systems. Also, since the city's managed care 
system was built upon a foundation of existing mental health resources in San 
Francisco, minimal changes in infrastructure were required to make the transition. 
The city was not new to managed care, as it had previously constructed a capitated 
program resembling managed care for severely emotionally disturbed children and in 
the adult sector, it had already begun limiting services to a target population. Finally, 
since the design of the California system stipulated that managed care was to be 
phased in over the course of several years, the chance of a Tennessee-like scenario, 
with sudden massive change and resulting chaos, was minimized. 
Setting the Stage for Managed Care 
San Francisco's system of mental health care began moving towards managed 
care in the early 1990's. Prior to this, the system was a loose network of community 
programs, private providers, private hospitals, and the county hospital, San Francisco 
General Hospital (SFGH). Services were disjointed and uncoordinated, and clients' 
primary providers shifted frequently, each time that a client changed service 
locations. For example, if a client was hospitalized, their primary provider usually 
changed. This limited continuity of care and was confusing for clients, who often did 
not have anyone responsible for organizing and coordinating their services. Access to 
the system was uncontrolled and decentralized, managed by each client's individual 
care provider. 
The county department of mental health, which was largely responsible for 
funding and running public community mental health programs and for managing the 
care provided through Short-Doyle MediCal funds, was a "hands-off manager. It 
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required very little data to be reported by community programs, and its only formal 
tracking system was its computerized billing system, which was a database designed 
for financial management, not for organizing clinical care. In addition, the county 
public hospital, which housed the city's psychiatric emergency services and most of 
its inpatient facilities, was operating quasi-independently; the department of mental 
health exercised minimal oversight over the facility, and even the hospital's budget 
was administered separately from that of the rest of the department. 
Funding of public psychiatric services was mainly through MediCal, 
Medicare, and the City's General Fund (for indigent care), but MediCal funding had 
been split into two streams. Short Doyle and Fee For Service MediCal (FFS). The 
county administered the Short Doyle MediCal funds, which were used for some 
inpatient services and a large amount of community-based care, and the state was 
responsible for FFS MediCal, making direct payments to private hospitals and 
practitioners. The state-run system was not formally linked to that of the county, 
although there was a large amount of overlap between the two systems. This was 
quite important, as a study found that the 13% of MediCal clients who used resources 
of both systems were responsible for 36% of the expenses incurred. Unfortunately, no 
means existed for identifying or tracking these overlap clients. 
San Francisco County published its Strategic Plan for Mental Health in 1990, 
based upon a 1989 needs assessment conducted with various stakeholders in the 
system (consumers, family members, doctors, nurses, social workers, program 
directors, etc.). The Plan delineated the goals and values of the San Francisco mental 
health system, stating that it must be "community-based, culturally competent, and 

13 
consumer-guided.32 It also defined a target population for public mental health 
services for the first time, initiating a major change in the treatment culture of a city 
committed to an ideal of universal access. (The Plan did not clearly spell out its 
priorities for the immediate future, which proved to be problematic when budget cuts 
and a statewide recession interfered with its implementation.) 
The next major change affecting statewide provision of mental health was the 
process known as "Realignment," heralded by state's passage of the 
BronsonMcCorqodale Act of 1991. Realignment was an attempt by the state to create 
a stable form of funding for mental health services and to devolve responsibility for 
administration of these funds to the 58 individual counties in the state. Statewide 
funding was created by the passage of a vehicle licensing fee and increased sales tax, 
and to access their portion, each county was required to submit matching funds. As a 
result of this bill, counties were now empowered to decide how many beds they 
needed in the state psychiatric hospitals and locked "Institutes for Mental Disease" 
(IMDs) and to contract with the state for the use of these beds. By gaining control of 
these functions previously controlled by the state, counties gained increased 
autonomy and flexibility in administering mental health services. As a result, many 
counties decreased their number of IMD and state hospital beds, and used the 
proceeds to fund new local alternative treatment options. 
In 1993, two bills were passed which affected local provision of MediCal 
services: The MediCal Rehabilitation Option and The MediCal Coordinated Services 
Act. The former expanded the number and type of services for which counties were 
able to bill MediCal to include less traditional treatment settings, such as vocational 

14 
rehabilitation. This bill was passed in response to a statewide survey, which found 
that the mentally ill placed a higher priority on their need for housing and jobs than 
upon their need for changes in clinical treatment. 
The Coordinated Services Act required that counties administer two changes, 
which ultimately eased the transition to managed care. First, it required that they 
change the way in which clients entered the mental health system. Clients were still 
able to access the system via any provider, but now needed to be assigned a 
coordinator once in the system. This person would bear primary responsibility for 
managing a patient's treatment services. As part of this process, clients and their 
coordinators had to compose a yearly "Coordination Plan," which documented 
necessity for services, outlined a client's treatment goals and authorized those services 
needed to meet the goals. The second requirement of the Act was that counties 
implement ongoing quality management programs to ensure compliance with the 
program. 
1993 also saw major structural changes initiated at the San Francisco Division 
of Mental Health in reaction to the budget cuts and recession of the early 1990's. 
These cuts threatened to drastically decrease the SMI population served by the 
department from 13,000 to 8,000 people. The division was again forced to evaluate 
its policies and value system, and concluded that it needed to manage its services 
differently. 
It began to enforce target population criteria by creating four Integrated 
Service Centers (ISCs) which would act as single points of entry to the mental health 
system. The centers consolidated many services under one roof, including medication 
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management, urgent care, individual and group therapy, and self-help. Each center 
serves a specific region of the city and also serves a specific cultural or ethnic group. 
For example, the center located in The Mission, a Latino neighborhood, has a focus 
on Latinos, with Spanish speaking therapists. Other groups associated with specific 
centers include homeless people, gays and lesbians, and Chinese and Russian 
immigrants. The development of the ISCs simplified the process of access for many 
consumers in the system and created a means for delivering culturally appropriate 
care. The centers are centrally managed and employ a standardized set of criteria to 
determine entry to the mental health system, creating system-wide consistency. In 
addition, each center is required to submit treatment data periodically, facilitating the 
system-wide determination of outcomes from a central location. 
The consequences of this reorganization were far reaching, and although they 
were a reaction to budget cuts, they prepared the county well for the onset of 
managed care. The establishment of the ISCs created neighborhood-based single 
points of entry into the mental health system; their responsibility for local clients 
helped clarify accountability in the new system. Data collection and tracking of ISC 
clients ushered in an "outcomes and performance driven" orientation, while 
centralized authorization of services began to shift power to the future administration 
of managed care. Finally, the ISCs restriction of entry to members of a target 
population effectively placed them in the role of gatekeepers to the system. 
These changes were not made easily. Treatment providers in San Francisco 
were committed to the ideal of universal access and were averse to restricting services 
only to those who fit a paper definition of need. They also were used to the "old way 
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of doing things," when they operated fairly autonomously and were not required to 
submit reams of paperwork in order to be paid. Giving up control to a centralized 
power was very difficult for most community providers. Adjusting to the new roles of 
coordinators and ISCs was also a challenge, requiring a change in the treatment 
culture. Many people viewed the addition of coordinators and ISCs as the imposition 
of another layer of bureaucracy to an already top-heavy system. " Clients were 
entered into the system without going through an ISC. Often, the coordinators were 
ignored or not contacted when a client was in need and when they were contacted, 
they frequently were unaware of their duties. 
MediCal Managed Care Emerges 
Planning for inpatient consolidation in San Francisco began in earnest in 
March 1994 with the City and County Health Commission's passage of a bill 
"Endorsing the Development of Managed Mental Health Care."14 The Division of 
Mental Health compiled an interdisciplinary transition team to begin preparations for 
consolidation. The team, consisting of psychiatric nurses, a psychiatrist, and 
psychologist, among others, began a series of mock chart reviews in applicable 
private hospitals, discussing their concerns with hospital staff and developing an 
administrative system to handle the new responsibility. A 24-hour admission 
notification hotline was set up, and initial policies and procedures were devised. 
In order to determine the characteristics of the FFS patient population, a 
descriptive study was completed of all FFS admissions in November and December 
1994. It had been unclear whether the FFS population would represent a largely new 
clientele (aside from the overlap clients mentioned earlier), but the study determined 
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that almost all were clients known to the public mental health system. Of these, only 
60% were coordinated, indicating that this was an issue needing to be addressed. The 
most interesting finding of the study concerned recidivism - many patients were 
cycling between the private and the public system, but because the private hospital 
system operated as a series of independent providers, none of this was realized. 
Patients would show up at the Emergency Room of one facility, stay a few days, and 
then upon discharge, appear at the Emergency Room of another hospital. An 
administrator described this confusion saying, "its as if they (the hospitals) just found 
these people under a rock, with no history, no knowledge of anything, and an entirely 
unnecessary new workup is done."3' Finally, the study found the issue of substance 
abuse found to be a major problem, as 70% of the sample had past or current 
substance abuse problems.36 
Inpatient consolidation occurred as planned, on January 1, 1995, and as the 
system developed, it became apparent that discharges from the hospitals were delayed 
by a lack of available mental health transitional beds, costing the county thousands of 
valuable dollars. In order to alleviate the situation, the "Bed Committee" was formed. 
Its mission was to authorize and prioritize the use of beds funded by the mental health 
system, and in particular, to ensure that the most severely ill clients were adequately 
served. It was composed of administrators from the public and private sectors, both 
hospital and community based. Inclusion of representation from the substance abuse 
establishment was particularly important, as was representation from the nonprofit 
organizations that managed the community mental heath beds. 
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The Bed Committee was crucial to the evolution of San Francisco's managed 
care system. It represented the first time that most of the stakeholders in the system 
had gathered to discuss the problems of determining dispositions for clients in crisis. 
In accomplishing this task, working coalitions were constructed and discussions held 
about correcting deficiencies of the system. The Bed Committee also served as a 
forum for the heads of the Division of Mental Health to establish authority in a 
difficult power struggle. The issues of provider autonomy, control of data, and 
resistance to change were played out among those with the most authority in this 
setting. Finally, the Bed Committee contributed a new database and a wealth of data 
to the new mental health plan, which would aid in the tracking and coordination of 
clients. 
Other changes emerged as the new mental health plan developed. The issue of 
recidivism originally identified in the pilot study was addressed by the formation of a 
"High User Review" committee. A Mobile Crisis Team was formed to aid clients in 
crisis and simultaneously avoid the use of costly Psychiatric Emergency Services. 
Oversight of the county hospital and Psychiatric Emergency Services was 
strengthened as it became apparent that the private FFS hospitals were more 
efficiently managing admissions than the county hospital while achieving equivalent 
results. A locked "rehabilitation" facility was opened in the county, providing more 
flexibility in the intermediate care system, while 80 IMD beds were reduced. Finally, 
the relationship between substance abuse and psychiatric services was strengthened, 
as it became apparent that dual diagnosis treatment was a key to providing effective 
treatment for hospitalized clients. Target Cities, a department of the city's substance 
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abuse services, assigned a particular staff member to act as liaison between the two 
systems. This person conducted assessments of clients, while they were still 
inpatients, if necessary. He also sat on the bed committee, and was responsible for 
linking mental health patients to the appropriate substance abuse programs when this 
was requested by the committee. 
Measuring Outcomes of Managed Care 
Development of Outcome Indicators 
Controversy exists about how to best measure outcomes of managed care 
strategies, particularly in the realm of mental health. Traditionally, managed care 
companies have relied upon fiscal data and service utilization data to evaluate their 
achievements. In mental health, this translates into such measures as rates of inpatient 
and outpatient utilization, length of stay in acute care facilities, average cost per 
client, and total expenses of the system. These measures, if used alone, are 
inappropriate outcome measures for evaluating psychiatric outcomes, because they 
have no relation to the clinical or functional status of patients. For example, when 
inpatient service utilization is cut, a patient's clinical symptoms may worsen. Unless 
relevant data is incorporated into outcome measures, this possibility cannot be 
evaluated. 
It remains unclear what this relevant data should be. Clinical and functional 
surveys, such as the Beck Depression Inventory and the Global Assessment of 
Functioning, can help to evaluate these issues, but these tools also are of limited use, 
as they do not address a patient's quality of life; also, many are quite time consuming 
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and therefore cannot be applied on a system-wide basis. Surveys on quality of life, 
such as Lehman's Quality of Life Inventory (QOLI), address quality of life issues, but 
these scores often do not correlate well with a patient’s overall clinical status.’7 38* 
The time frame required for an evaluation of systems of care to capture 
relevant outcomes is also unknown. The impact of changes in care may take months 
to years to fully develop. In fact, of several studies which have indicated that prepaid 
mental health care had a detrimental effect upon the overall functioning of 
schizophrenics, all found that their results attained significance only after one to two 
years of capitation. 
Another important problem with current outcome indicators is that they do not 
acknowledge mental health expenses carried by other sectors of society, including 
patients' families. Mental health is somewhat unique among health care fields, 
because its failures manifest themselves in areas not traditionally associated with the 
provision of health care, such as homelessness and forensics. If outcome measures 
focus only on the services provided by a mental health care organization, they would 
not adequately assess whether a policy has succeeded or failed. Cutting funding and 
services to the mentally ill is analogous to squeezing a balloon - when one end is 
compressed, the rest expands. Unless the expanded parts of the system serving the 
SMI are assessed, the true costs of their care will be drastically underestimated. 
In order to be useful in this era of limited budgets and managed care, 
outcomes indicators must therefore account for cost shifting and patients' clinical and 
* * In the above cited studies, Lehman, et al. found that the QOLI was not predictive of rehospitalization in any 
domain except that of family relations and that psychiatric facility type was not predictive of specific QOLI 

functional status while also measuring cost containment and service utilization. Since 
accountability for outcomes is an important goal of managed care, development of 
functional, practical indicators will be important in the coming years. In fact, 
organizations responsible for mental health are already struggling to develop outcome 
indicators that reflect this goal, yet are achievable given restricted budgets and time. 
The National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI) recently issued its first 
"managed care report card," which it used to grade private behavioral health care 
companies. The report card evaluated the firms' performance in nine realms, 
including the areas of inpatient care, rehabilitation services, alternatives to traditional 
care, access to the most effective medications, engagement of patients and families in 
treatment plans, use of outcomes research, and assurance of stable housing.39 All of 
the firms failed NAMI's report card, which makes it unlikely to appeal to many 
current providers of mental health care, but the high standards embodied in the report 
card should not be ignored; rather, they should be used to help plan necessary 
services for the future. 
Measures Used in this Study 
This study will evaluate the impact of managed care upon the lives of the 
severely mentally ill by looking at acute, intermediate, and chronic outcomes, and by 
exploring whether external indicators of inadequate care, in particular, homelessness, 
substance abuse, and high arrest rates, have changed since managed care's 
implementation in San Francisco. The measures need to address whether clients are 
successfully transitioned back into the community after a crisis, and whether, once 
outcomes on most domains. 

there, they are able to chronically maintain this level of functioning. Conversely, the 
measures also need to assess whether managed care has caused an increase in 
instability in the lives of these patients. 
Systemic changes in acute care can be easily evaluated using managed care's 
standard evaluation tools. Aggregate numbers such as the average length of stay for 
hospitalizations and the number of inpatient and emergency room episodes per person 
accurately reflect the presence or absence of crises in a population, while they also 
can be employed as standard measures of inpatient and emergency care usage. In 
addition, since virtually all of the city's mentally ill in an acute crisis are cared for in 
the city's hospitals, these numbers will capture all of the crises of the desired 
population. The one exception is that these numbers do not represent acutely ill 
individuals in the county jail, since they are cared for on the jail psychiatric ward 
whose statistics are not included here. 
The systemic changes in intermediate and long-term levels of care are more 
difficult to measure, because treatment programs and providers are scattered 
throughout the city. San Francisco's intermediate level of care consists of a series of 
graduated residential programs designed to integrate clients back into the community 
after a mental health crisis. Clients enter this level of care after hospitalization or 
upon diversion from hospitalization and then progress though one or more of these 
residences before ultimately returning to the community. 
A variety of programs are incorporated into this category, including halfway 
houses, three-quarter-way houses, dual diagnosis programs, triple diagnosis programs 
(HIV, mental illness, and substance abuse), and programs run by the substance abuse 

division of public health. Clients who no longer need acute care, but are not yet able 
to make the transition back into the community are placed in Institutes for Mental 
Disease (IMDs), locked facilities which function as subacute wards. Clients usually 
stay in these facilities for a few months to a year, while they stabilize, and then they 
are funneled into the system of residences described above. 
The intermediate level of care may be assessed via the amount of clients using 
the system, their average lengths of stay, and the average number of residences each 
person has dwelt in, but unlike the categories of acute and chronic care, it is unclear 
what system-wide outcomes are desired. Positive outcomes are difficult to define in 
this category. A longer length of stay may be viewed as a success, as the client is 
committed to his/her treatment, or as a failure, since the client is unable to return to 
the community in a standard length of time. Similarly, if more clients are using the 
system, this may be viewed as a negative sign, since people are in crisis and needing 
extra supports, or as a positive sign, indicating that the system is responding better to 
those in need, especially if outpatient treatment is used to divert people from more 
costly hospitalizations. 
In evaluating changes in long term, chronic care, an ideal assessment tool 
would include measures of quality of life, functional ability, and clinical status. 
Unfortunately, these are time consuming and difficult to obtain for a large population. 
For a system like San Francisco's, that serves almost 20,000 people, this would be 
impossible. A proxy measure for clinical and functional status must therefore be used. 
Attainment and maintenance of stable housing can function as such a 
measure. In studies conducted by the California and San Francisco Departments of 
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Public Health, consumers of mental health services consistently identified housing as 
one of their primary needs.40 A 1992 survey conducted by the San Francisco chapter 
of NAMI found similar concerns among the family members of the mentally ill. 
When asked to name the most important services they needed and were not receiving, 
housing was cited more frequently than any other type of service.41 Attainment of 
stable housing by the mentally ill is also associated with greater life satisfaction, as 
measured by Lehman's Quality of Life Index. When compared with their homeless 
counterparts, the housed mentally ill had significantly higher levels of satisfaction 
with their social supports, leisure time, family relations, finances, daily activities, and 
overall living situation.42 
Stability of housing may be assessed using statistics similar to those used to 
measure acute and intermediate levels of care, including the number of individuals in 
stable, long term housing and average lengths of stay. This category includes any 
stable community housing which can support a length of stay of at least several years. 
Clients living independently and with their families are counted here, as are those 
housed in facilities such as board and care homes, support services hotels, and 
supported coops. The latter two types of supported housing are generally geared 
towards rehabilitation, with the goal of eventual independent living, but stays in these 
facilities can last for several years, as compared to the stays in intermediate level 
facilities, which may last for months rather than years. Board and care homes, on the 
other hand, are typically used to house the more functionally impaired, those for 
whom independent living is unlikely. 
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Several other residential situations did not fit into the study’s categories of 
acute, intermediate, or permanent levels of care. These include time living in jail, at 
the state psychiatric hospital, and on the streets or in homeless shelters. They are also 
evaluated, but separately. They are important to consider, as they are indications of 
the amount of cost shifting created by a total system of care. 
Costs External to the System of Care 
Housing and Homelessness 
Literal homelessness and housing instability are a major problem for the 
mentally ill and their families. Homeless individuals and their families frequently cite 
mental illness and substance abuse problems as precipitants of their homelessness. In 
focus groups conducted with this population in San Francisco, people specifically 
noted that obtaining stable housing was quite difficult without adequate substance 
abuse treatment, mental health services, and crisis intervention support.43 
An estimated 30 to 40% of San Francisco's homeless population is SMI, 
numbering approximately 2500 in 1994.44‘ A 1989 study of the SF homeless 
population found that 22.4% had received psychiatric services in the past year and 
34.7% had a history of at least one psychiatric hospitalization. The same study also 
found that homeless people comprised 22% of the patients on hospital psychiatric 
wards.45 A study compiled two years earlier noted that homeless or unstably housed 
people constituted 46% of the users of San Francisco's crisis clinics.46 
* The figure of 2500 SMI homeless people was obtained using the more conservative estimate of 30%. 
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Since most of the SMI rely on public funds as their sole source of income, rent 
is often unattainably expensive. In a city like San Francisco where the housing market 
is extremely tight, even the lowest of rents is out of reach of many mentally ill people. 
The mental health system is quite limited in its capacity to respond to these needs, 
overseeing approximately 2000 beds, a number unable to house even 12% of their 
clients.47 48 
Once on the streets, the homeless mentally ill often fare worse than their 
mentally sound counterparts. They are frequently unable to access shelters because 
behavioral rules exclude them and they are then forced to live in parks or on the 
streets. Some actually choose this option, fearful of being victimized by other shelter 
residents. In San Francisco, this situation seems to have worsened over the past 10 
years. In 1986, the mentally ill accounted for 21% of the shelter population and 32% 
of the "unsheltered" population. By 1993, they were only 5 to 15% of the shelter 
population but had grown to 59% of the "unsheltered" population. Since San 
Francisco's crackdowns on homeless people in 1997 and 1998, this situation has 
probably worsened. 
Several recent studies have investigated the relationship between mental 
illness and homelessness, finding that the only consistent predictors of achieving 
stable housing were related to substance abuse recovery. In Washington, DC, Bebout 
et al. provided 122 homeless dually diagnosed adults with case management, 
integrated dual diagnosis treatment, and a continuum of available residences. Over 
the next 18 months, only active substance abuse, progress toward recovery from 
substance abuse, and quality of life were associated with stable housing. Residential 
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history and psychiatric symptoms, the other variables investigated, were unrelated to 
participants' housing status. Final housing status at 18 months was not predicted by 
any baseline variables, but was predicted by progress toward recovery at months 0 - 6 
and 6-12 and by less severe drug use at months 6-12. Abstinence from drug use 
during months 6-12 corresponded with an increased likelihood of achieving stable 
housing that was three times that of nonabstainers. These results buttress earlier 
findings by the San Diego McKinney study that homeless mentally ill individuals 
who reported no alcohol or drug problems at the time of study entry were 2.04 and 
2.66 times more likely, respectively, to maintain stable community housing. 
Homelessness among the mentally ill is also associated with higher arrest and 
assault rates. A survey of mentally ill inmates at a New York City jail found that their 
rate of homelessness was 21 times higher than that of other mentally ill individuals in 
the city.49 In the San Francisco County Jail in the early 1990’s, 85% of the mentally 
ill inmates were homeless at the time of arrest. This number represents a substantial 
increase from the mid- 1 980's, when only 45% of mentally ill inmates indicated a 
current need for housing.50,51 
Jail and Mental Illness 
Serious mental illness is quite prevalent in the San Francisco County Jail. In 
1991, 25% of the inmates were current users of the city's mental health system at the 
time of their arrest. A history of previous psychiatric hospitalization was also fairly 
common among the inmates, characterizing 15% of the males and 23% of the 
females.52 Among homeless inmates, the amount of mental illness is particularly 
high, with a study from the mid-1980's finding that 38% had a history of psychiatric 
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hospitalization.33 A 1982 study of inmates referred for psychiatric evaluation (in a 
different county's jail) revealed that 99% had a previous psychiatric hospitalization, 
92% had arrest records, 80% exhibited "severe and overt psychopathology." and more 
than 75% met the criteria for civil commitment.34 
Nationally, 6 to 15% of the inmates in city and county jails and 10 to 15% of 
the inmates in state prisons are severely mentally ill.55 Reports of large increases in 
the number of mentally ill individuals in the criminal justice system first appeared in 
the 1970's and these numbers have grown over the past 25 years.56 In the Los 
Angeles County Jail, 15% of the inmates are severely mentally ill, leading one expert 
to label this huge jail "the largest mental health facility in the United States."37 
This situation is the result of two societal trends, the move toward 
deinstitutionalization in the mental health sector and the huge increase in prisons and 
prison sentences in the criminal justice sector. It is a situation which was eerily 
predicted by Penrose in 1939, when he theorized that a fairly stable number of people 
would be confined at any one time in modem industrial societies, whether in prisons 
or mental institutions. He then showed that in 18 European countries, an inverse 
relationship did, in fact, exist between the size of prison populations and mental 
hospital populations.58 
A history of recent arrest is correlated with several clinical factors in the 
mentally ill population. Arrest within the past 2 months is associated with increased 
risk of psychiatric rehospitalization.59 If this arrest was for a violent crime, the 
arrested individual was likely to be lacking current psychiatric treatment, not taking 
medications, and actively using drugs or alcohol at the time of arrest.60 
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Homelessness is fairly common among SMI inmates, as was illustrated 
earlier, but it is approximately twice as common among those charged with 
misdemeanors as among those charged with felonies.61 Since misdemeanor arrests are 
often for deviant behavior and not for the commission of actual "crimes," it appears 
that many mentally ill may face misdemeanor arrest for merely exhibiting the 
symptoms of their illness. This suggests that misdemeanor arrests may actually 
represent a sign of decompensation, indicating that more social supports are needed to 
maintain individuals successfully in the community. 
Special Populations 
Identifying unique subpopulations and their special needs can help in the 
planning and evaluation of mental health systems. Results may differ in surprising 
ways when certain groups are removed from the overall equation of care. These 
results can indicate whether specific people have suffered since the introduction of 
managed care, and can subsequently guide appropriate interventions. Some groups of 
people may have flourished since managed care's implementation; these success 
stories can also provide valuable information for future planning and possibly 
indicate underutilized resources or strategies that would benefit the entire system. 
The identification of special subpopulations and evaluation of their needs can 
also help target treatments to those who will benefit most from them. For example, as 
discussed earlier, substance abusing mentally ill individuals are likely to evidence a 
set of problems in their daily lives very different from those of their non-substance 
using counterparts. Interventions such as housing programs would likely be less 
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important to a population without substance abuse than would other programs which 
were more relevant to their daily lives. 
Recipients of Medicare and Medicaid 
As noted earlier, a majority of SMI in the United States has their health care 
paid for by Medicaid and/or Medicare. In 1994, 60% of all psychiatric admissions 
were paid for by one of these programs.62 A survey of the San Francisco Chapter of 
the Alliance for the Mentally III found that 80.6% of members' SMI family/friends 
were receiving Medicare or Medicaid, and another 6% received some other form of 
public assistance.63 
Medicaid and Medicare are separate federal programs designed to help fund 
health care for disabled individuals and the elderly; as such, they are tied to the 
receipt of either Social Security Disability Income (SSDI) or Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI). SSDI is a type of insurance program for workers with a sufficient 
employment history; it covers either the workers themselves if they have become 
disabled, or covers their disabled spouses or adult children. It is funded through the 
Social Security Trust Fund and includes the provision of a monthly income 
supplement as well as medical insurance through Medicare. Persons who receive 
Medicare may also receive Medicaid, as long as they qualify for both. 
In contrast to this, SSI is a type of social welfare program with no work 
history requirements, only limits upon earnings and total assets. In order to receive 
SSI, and its health insurance component. Medicaid, a person's income cannot earn 
more than a certain amount each month ($500 in 1992) and his/her total assets cannot 
exceed a specified amount. SSI is funded through general federal taxes and state 
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moneys; its monthly stipend and Medicaid allocations are typically much less than 
those provided by SSDI/Medicare. For example, in 1991, SSI provided an allowance 
of $335 per month while SSDI provided the much greater sum of $587 per month.64 
Clearly, SSDI and Medicare offer better benefits for recipients; it is unclear 
whether this difference causes a significant variation in treatment outcomes when this 
group is compared to recipients of SSI/Medicaid. The two groups differ in their 
demographics: slightly less than 2/3 of the mentally disabled recipients of SSDI are 
male, while more than 1/2 of those on SSI are female. In addition, those on SSDI are 
of a slightly older average age than those on SSI. 
The meaning of these numbers is open to interpretation. By virtue of 
compiling a sufficient work history, Medicare recipients may be less severely ill than 
those on Medicaid. On the other hand, completion of sufficient employment may 
simply mean that mental illness struck at a later age, after several years of working. In 
particular, this would be possible with schizophrenia, where age of onset can vary by 
up to 15 years. Another possibility is that recipients may receive Medicare and SSDI 
as disabled dependents of a working person. This could indicate the presence of 
strong family supports and thus may mean more resources for the Medicare recipient. 
Finally, the possibility exists that initially, recipients of Medicare exhibited no 
clinical differences from the Medicaid recipients, but that after time, they achieved a 
higher level of clinical functioning and better quality of life secondary to the better 
benefit package they receive. 

Transients 
Many mentally ill individuals live nomadic lives, never finding a permanent 
home, without constant work, and having few close relationships. The epidemic of 
homelessness among the mentally ill is but one symptom of this larger problem. A 
disabled individual who is constantly in motion is at a severe disadvantage, because 
ongoing ties to a doctor or health care professional are necessary to ensure that 
adequate care is being provided. 
San Francisco is particularly prone to attracting wanderers, whether because 
of its mild climate, liberal reputation, or history of hippies and "free love" in the park. 
Transients may therefore be more plentiful in San Francisco than in other places, 
which makes a cohesive, responsive health care system quite difficult to organize. In 
addition, coordination of a client's services under managed care and monitoring of 
his/her outcomes are virtually impossible to achieve if the client is nowhere to be 
found. 
In the mental health arena in particular, many transients are lost to the system 
due to incarceration, homelessness, or hospitalization in other regions. Others may be 
functioning well for a period of time and lose contact with their doctors. It is unclear 
precisely how the transient population differs from their more stably located 
counterparts - they may be less severely ill, and thus able to last for long periods 
without contact with the mental health system. On the other hand, they may be so 
severely disorganized that they are unable to keep appointments or maintain any type 
of "home base," and may differ from other mentally ill individuals mainly in their 

lack of a strong support structure. They may also have higher rates of substance abuse 
or more severe substance abuse problems than other mentally ill people. 
Assertive Community' Treatment (ACT) Programs 
ACT programs are intensive community-based programs for severely mentally 
ill individuals who are unable to maintain themselves in the community without 
comprehensive case management and close supervision. They specifically target 
clients who have frequent hospitalizations, drug noncompliance, and high use of 
emergency and other crisis services. The goal of an ACT program is to foster 
independent, community-based living for its clients, while improving their daily lives 
with a network of supports, including 24-hour on-call status, assistance with housing 
and finances, and frequent social contact. ACT programs have been tested in 
numerous clinical trials, whose results indicate that the programs improve perceived 
quality of life, increase independent living, increase housing stability, and decrease 
hospital admissions and emergency department visits for the severely and chronically 
mentally ill.65 66 ACT clients' treatment patterns, and in particular, their usage of 
acute services, will therefore provide an interesting contrast to that of their non-ACT 
peers in San Francisco's mental health system. 
San Francisco began to use the ACT model with its mental health clients in 
early 1997 as a response to the very high costs of the system's "high users." The 
ACTs mission was to reduce overall costs while shifting the locus of care from an 
acute focus to a community-based outpatient setting. Criteria for client selection 
included the stipulation that any participant must have cost the department $20,000 
for two of the past three years. No preference was assigned to Medicare, MediCal, or 
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non-MediCal-eligible clients; all were equally likely to be offered the opportunity to 
participate. 
Questions and Hypothesis 
The overarching question guiding the formation of this study is whether the 
implementation of managed care in San Francisco will change the lives of the city's 
chronically mentally ill. The study's main hypothesis is that mental health managed 
care can reduce overall spending while maintaining or even improving quality of care 
in a county-based, publicly managed system. This will result from an increased focus 
on stable, long term care and simultaneous reduction of the use of costly hospital and 
emergency services. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that a county based system will 
be particularly invested in reducing cost shifting to other sectors of the government. It 
is expected to utilize its interdepartmental networks to encourage the development of 
dual diagnosis programs, stable, long term housing alternatives, and linkages between 
the mental health system and other public agencies, including the forensics system. 
Finally, managed care is hypothesized to encourage flexibility and innovation in 
planning and providing services; this will be investigated by examining the 
development of new programs, organizational changes, and issues of increased 
advocacy. 
Levels of Care: Expected Changes 
Expectations are that acute care will experience reductions in the use of 
hospitals and psychiatric emergency services. The total number of days in both forms 
of care is expected to decrease, as are admissions and lengths of stay. If clients were 
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admitted to a hospital ward from an emergency room, this transition would occur in 
less time than in previous years. In addition, as inappropriate admissions for 
substance abuse were eliminated, more substance abusers would be diverted to detox 
facilities. 
The changes occurring in the acute care sector should appear quite soon after 
the implementation of managed care. Because acute care typically involves episodes 
with shorter lengths of stay and more episodes are possible in a short period of time, 
changes in usage patterns will manifest themselves in months, not years. Also, the 
fact that the changes involve service reductions and would save money makes them 
more likely to be implemented quickly in a time of budget cuts. 
Managed care's expected emphasis upon long term, stable forms of care will 
appear more slowly, over the course of several years. It is somewhat more difficult to 
measure because long term services are community-based and scattered, involving 
many types of programs with different definitions of success. Measurement of 
success in this category is based on an absence of crisis and years of stable residence; 
ultimately, the system should see more clients experiencing longer lengths of stay in 
stable residences. 
Changes expected in the intermediate system of care depend upon the time 
frame viewed. In the long term, it is unclear whether managed care will result in 
increased use of this system as a less costly alternative to hospitalization, or in 
decreased use, since these facilities consume resources which could otherwise be 
devoted to expanding long term care. In the short term, however, the intermediate 
level of care should see an upsurge demand for services as managed care's emphasis 
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on shorter hospitalizations creates an increased flow of patients needing to transition 
back to the community. Eventually, this pressure should diminish as the overall 
number of hospitalizations in the target population is reduced. 
1996 as a crisis year 
The above expectations must be modified somewhat due to the fact that the 
study population was in a time of crisis in 1996. As stated earlier, the sample was 
selected because they were in need of mental health housing and were presented to 
the "Bed Committee" at some point in 1996; the care given in the immediate 
aftermath should illustrate an appropriate response to clients in crisis, with an initial 
increase in acute care followed by a one to two year period of increased intermediate 
level care. By the end of the study in 1998, the population is expected to have 
returned to patterns typifying chronic levels of care. 
Subpopulations 
Several subpopulations mentioned earlier are expected to affect the results in 
predictable ways. For example, substance abusers, in general, experience more 
homelessness, more interactions with the criminal justice system, and more 
victimization. If they are removed from the overall sample, these problems should 
diminish in importance. In addition, as it is expected that managed care will promote 
the usage of detox programs and the development of dual diagnosis programs, the 
substance abusers may use less acute psychiatric services over time. 
Medicare and MediCal clients are expected to increase in number as more 
clients become adequately linked to benefits in effort to generate revenue. In addition, 
if Medicare clients are higher functioning or are receiving better services than 
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nonMedicare clients, as discussed earlier, they would be expected to use less acute 
services, to live more independently, and to experience less overall homelessness and 
drug use. 
At baseline, ACT clients are expected to be high users of acute services, with 
more drug abuse problems and more homelessness. Following implementation of the 
ACT program in 1997, their usage of hospital and emergency services would be 
expected to drop, although it is unclear how quickly this change will occur. More 
rapid linkage to substance abuse services is also anticipated, as is a decrease in 
housing instability and homelessness. In the long term, ACT clients are expected to 
achieve permanent housing at a faster rate than previously, although it is unclear how 
this rate should compare to their non-ACT counterparts. 
Expectations of the transient population remain unclear. If they are truly "in 
transit" and are not living in San Francisco on the streets or in jail, then minimal 
change in usage patterns should result. If they live in San Francisco and are 
episodically affected by flare-ups of their mental illness, they may be difficult to 
distinguish from those "in transit"; however, if they live in San Francisco and are very 
low functioning, once they become coordinated and linked to appropriate resources. 
their usage of services may increase. 
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Methods 
Sample 
The sample consisted of 154 cases presented to the Bed Committee in the first 
week of Feb., March, April, May, June, July and Aug. 1996. These months were 
selected because they were the first months of the bed committee's existence. Clients 
were identified using the Bed Committee database; only San Francisco County clients 
were included, and each client was required to have at least one hospitalization prior 
to the episode leading to referral to the Bed Committee. 
Most of the sample cases were referred to the Bed Committee for placement 
following a hospital stay or a stay in an institution, although some were referred as a 
diversion effort, in order to avoid a more costly hospitalization. Clients referred to the 
Bed Committee were among the more severely mentally ill individuals in the county 
system, as they all required publicly funded mental health beds, and not just 
outpatient treatment, following hospitalization. 
INSYST, the billing and records system for Mental Health and Substance 
Abuse, and the Bed Committee database were the sources of most of the information 
used. Other sources included original Bed Committee referral forms, interviews with 
administrative staff, and departmental memos and reports. Study procedures were 
approved by the Division's committee on human research. 
Procedures 
Usage patterns were determined using INSYST and Bed Committee records. 
Aggregate acute care data included all hospitalizations and emergency services. Use 
of emergency services was defined as use of the Westside Crisis Center, the Mobile 
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Crisis Unit, or the Psychiatric Emergency Service (PES) at the San Francisco General 
Hospital. Hospitalizations included facilities both in and out of the county. Length of 
stay at emergency services was either 1 -day, if a client stayed overnight, or no days, 
if a client did not. Aggregate intermediate care data included IMDs, halfway houses, 
dual diagnosis treatment programs, substance abuse treatment programs, detox 
programs, and Acute Diversion Units (ADUs), short term subacute facilities in the 
community. Of the individual categories of intermediate care, "residential programs" 
included both halfway houses and ADUs, and "substance abuse" included detox, 
substance abuse, and dual diagnosis programs. Aggregate long term care data 
included board and care homes, support service hotels, coops, and living 
independently supported or with family. The category of "supported housing" 
included both support service hotels and supported coops. 
Time in jail, at the state psychiatric hospital, and living on the streets or in 
shelters were all considered separately from the above categories of acute, 
intermediate, and long term care. Time at the state hospital was documented in 
INSYST, while jail and homeless time were more difficult to determine. The figures 
used were estimated from the Bed Committee database and Bed Committee referral 
forms, which include pertinent data on substance abuse, medical problems, contact 
with the criminal justice system, and housing needs. Jail time was constructed using 
the reports of social workers and jail aftercare specialists included on the Bed 
Committee referral forms; if an arrest during the study period was noted and at least 
one date was provided, this was counted as a stay in jail. The length of stay was 
conservatively determined using the above reports and service utilization data (i.e. - a 
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person was not in jail if they were attending outpatient therapy). The category of 
"homeless" included persons known to be living on the streets, in shelters, or in short 
term SRO hotels. Dates were conservatively estimated using the above reports and 
service utilization data. If dates could not be determined, or the homeless state could 
not be confirmed, a person’s residence was categorized as "unknown." All "unknown" 
time was calculated by subtracting the total time a person's location was known from 
the number of days in a year (except in 1998, when 182 days, or half a year, was 
used). 
Several of the above categories may under or overestimate the amount of time 
spent in a location. In particular, the number of people with time in jail is probably 
underestimated, since it was dependent upon the knowledge of the hospital social 
worker or whoever filled out the Bed Committee Referral Form. Also, clients with 
time in jail may have been considered "closed" by the mental health system, because 
a client is ineligible for MediCal while they are in jail. Portions of the study also 
underestimate hospitalizations. In 1994, prior to implementation of inpatient 
consolidation, only hospitalizations at the county hospital were recorded in INSYST; 
the number of hospitalizations in this year should be viewed as being artificially low. 
After inpatient consolidation. Medicare clients still lacked adequate documentation of 
private hospital stays, as these were not recorded in INSYST since the county does 
not bill for care provided through Medicare (INSYST is primary a billing system, not 
a tracking system). The number of hospitalizations for Medicare clients may therefore 
also be artificially low. 
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Subpopulations 
Categorization of clients as Medicare, MediCal. or indigent was based upon 
their medical insurance as of August 1998 as documented by INSYST. INSYST was 
also used to document whether a client was included in an ACT program. 
Categorization of clients as substance abusers was based upon treatment 
records in INSYST as well as comments on the Bed Committee form and was 
considered to be positive if either source indicated that a client had a past or present 
substance abuse problem. Contact with Target Cities was documented in one or both 
places as well. 
Transience was determined by evaluating a client's treatment record and 
eligibility for San Francisco County Medicare/MediCal. If a client's eligibility status 
was unknown, and they had no contact with the mental health system during the year, 
they were considered closed for the year. If the client had no episodes for a majority 
of the year (i.e. - the first or last 10 months of a year) and any other episodes were 
few (less than three contacts), a client was considered closed for the year. For 
example, if a client had no contact with the mental health system in 1995 except for 
one emergency room episode on Dec 15th, this client was considered closed for the 
year. If a client was known to be eligible for Medicare or MediCal they were 
automatically considered to be "open in the system," even if they had no contact with 
the mental health system during the year. 
Demographics 
Clients' cost per year was obtained from INSYST records. Of note, the cost of 
stays in the state psychiatric hospital was not included in this figure. Clients' age and 
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sex were also from INSYST; all ages are from 1996, when the clients were originally 
presented to the Bed Committee. Documentation of any history of arrest or assault 
was mainly found in the Bed Committee referral forms. 
Data Analysis 
Data was compiled and analyzed using the Filemaker Pro database software. 
Tests of statistical significance were conducted using an independent sampling 
design; the student's t variable was calculated in a Filemaker Pro statistical program 
written by the author and the chi-square variable was calculated in Version 6 of the 
Epilnfo statistical program, using the StatCalc function. 
Time Frame 
The period of time covered began in Jan. 1994, one year prior to inpatient 
consolidation, and ended in June 1998, just after outpatient consolidation, which 
occurred in April 1998. Since the period of time examined in 1998 is only half of a 
year, some of the data is expected to lower than would occur in a full year's course. 
Where noted, these data have been "annualized" for the sake of comparison. This 
standardization was based upon changes in data from the first half of 1995 to the full 
year of 1995. Numbers were not simply doubled to obtain the values for the 
completed year, because this often did not accurately reflect reality. 

Results 
Results for the total sample are summarized in Table 1. The sample was 60% 
male, 38% female, and 1% transgender; the average age was 39.18 years old. 26% 
were known to have ever been arrested, and during the crisis year of 1996. 5% spent 
time in jail. 49% were known to have ever been assaulted, and 74% were current or 
past substance abusers. 
Table 1 
Full Sample (n=154) 
Year % Eligible Clients 
with Episode 
Avg Episodes 
per Person 
Avg total #Days 
per Year 
Acute Care 
1994 65.9 3.68 21.33 
1995 76.3 4.75 39.45 
1996 80.9 5.71 45.20 
1997 50.4 4.76 39.71 
1998 41.8 3.69 26.30 
Intermediate Care 
1994 52.7 2.08 156.1 
1995 53.5 2.23 137.8 
1996 82.9 2.26 117.4 
1997 47.6 2.18 183.8 
1998 34.6 1.71 161.8 
Permanent Residence 
1994 11.0 1.00 323.2 
1995 21.1 1.00 261.1 
1996 40.1 1.00 169.8 
1997 44.8 1.16 272.3 
1998 52.5 1.08 312.7 
Levels of acute care increased in 1996, and decreased thereafter to a level 
below that of the pre-managed care year of 1994. In 1994, 65.9% used inpatient or 
emergency services; this climbed to a high of 80.9% in the crisis year of 1996, and 
then rapidly descended to only 50.3% in 1997 and an estimated 41.8% in 1998, which 
is a statistically significant change from 1994 (see Table 2). Use of emergency 
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services also showed a marked decrease over the course of the study - whereas in 
1994 and 1995, approximately 64% of the sample used emergency services, by 1997 
only 46% used emergency services and by 1998, this had shrunk to an estimated 
41.7%, a statistically significant change when compared to 1994. A high of 72.4% of 
the sample used emergency services in 1996, with an average of 3.75 episodes per 
person. Average number of emergency room visits per person showed minimal 
change over the course of the study, while average length of stay per emergency room 
visit decreased consistently each year. 
The percentage of clients using inpatient services showed a similar decrease in 
the long term, while in the short term, it increased to a high of 75% in 1996. The 
long-term decrease was evidenced by a significant drop in usage to 27% of the 
population in 1998 from 64% in 1994. Average number of inpatient episodes per 
person showed minimal long term change but increased in 1996, while the total 
number of inpatient days (except in 1998) and the average length of stay for each 
hospitalization steady increased with each year of the study. 
The intermediate care system also evidenced interesting short term and long 
term changes. In the short term, increasing percentages of people used intermediate 
level resources, reaching a high of 82.9% in 1996. On a longer-term basis, 
percentages of the sample using these services decreased by the end of the study to a 
level significantly below that of 1994, while the average number of episodes per 
person hovered around two throughout the study. In the short term, average total 
number of days in intermediate care reached a nadir of 117.4 days in 1996 and a peak 
of 183.8 days in 1997. In the long term, trends for total number of days in 

45 
intermediate level care are still unclear, although the number began to decrease by 1998, 
Which may be indicative of a future trend. 
Figure 1 
Percentage of Eligible Clients in Each Level of Care 
Whole Sample (n=182) 
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Table 2 
1994 - 1998 Comparisons (X2 statistic) 
Entire Sample (n=154) 
1994 1998 Chi-Sq p-value 
# in Acute Care 60 55 115 uncorrected 12.7 <0.000 
# Not in Acute Care 31 77 108 Yates corrected 11.75 <0.000 
115 108 223 
# in Intermediate Level Care 48 46 94 uncorrected 7.08 0.008 
# No Intermediate Level Care 43 86 129 Yates corrected 6.36 0.011 
94 129 223 
# in Permanent Residence 10 69 79 uncorrected 40.13 <0.000 
# No Permanent Residence 81 63 144 Yates corrected 38.35 <0.000 
91 132 223 
# Using Psych Emergency 58 55 113 uncorrected 10.5 0.015 
# No Psych Emergency Use 33 77 110 Yates corrected 9.63 0.002 
91 132 223 
# Hospitalized 58 55 113 uncorrected 5.86 0.015 
# Not Hospitalized 33 77 110 Yates corrected 5.18 0.023 
91 132 223 
In terms of individual components of the intermediate level of care, while the 
percentage of the population using the IMDs remained fairly constant, their average 
length of stay decreased over the course of the study (See Appendices). An increased 
proportion of the population used halfway houses in 1996, but in 1997 and 1998 these 
numbers rapidly declined to below those of the pre-managed care and early managed 
care years of 1994 and 1995. Residential substance abuse programs had a drop in the 
proportion of the population using them in 1997 and 1998, although the total number 
of days in substance abuse programs steadily increased with each year of the study. 
The percentage of people in permanent stable residences climbed steadily 
each year, from a low of 11% in 1994 to a significantly different high of 52.5% by 
1998. The impact of 1996, if any existed, on these numbers was to speed the rate of 
increase. The total number of days spent in stable residences dipped in 1996, when 
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patients spent more time in higher levels of care, but climbed back to its pre-crisis 
levels in 1997 and 1998. Of the individual components of the long-term care 
category, supported housing showed an increase in the proportion of population 
served in 1996, but this actually began to decrease by 1998. The population living in 
board and care homes consistently increased in size throughout the study, while no 
obvious changes were seen in the long-term amount of people living independently or 
with their families. 
Homelessness seemed to peak in the crisis year of 1996, striking 
approximately 23% of the population, although on a long-term basis, around 9% of 
the sample was homeless per year. The proportion of the population in unknown 
living conditions steadily decreased over the course of the study from a high of 69.2% 
in 1994 to a low of 25.8% in 1998. 
Subpopulations: 
ACTs 
The population enrolled in ACT programs was slightly younger and more 
female and averaged a much higher cost per year than those not enrolled in ACTs. A 
smaller percentage of those in ACTs were substance abusers (69% versus 77%), but 
this was not statistically significant. A much higher proportion of substance abusers 
in ACTs had contact with Target Cities than did those not in ACTs (59% versus 
38%), a fact which did prove to be significant (uncorrected chi-square = 6.95, 
p=0.008; Yates corrected chi-square - 5.90, p=0.015). 
Whereas the percentages using acute care existed differed little between the 
two groups prior to 1996, a much higher percentage of those in ACTs used acute 
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services afterwards. In 1994. the proportions of ACT and non-ACT clients using 
acute services did not differ significantly, whereas the proportion of ACT clients 
using acute services in 1998 (57.3%) was significantly more than that of non-ACT 
clients (31.4%). (See appendices for statistics). The proportion of non-ACT clients 
hospitalized was significantly lower than that of the ACT clients lor both 1994 and 
1998, whereas the proportion using emergency services was only significantly lower 
in 1998. Over the course of the study, both groups consistently reduced their use of 
emergency and hospital services, although the average length of hospitalizations 
increased fairly steadily over the 4 years. 
A larger proportion of the ACT group used some intermediate care than did 
the non-ACT group in all years of the study. Tests of statistical significance of 
difference were only performed for the years 1994 and 1998, but in both these years, 
the differences achieved statistical significance. Over the study period, the 
proportions of both groups using intermediate level services increased in 1996 and 
1997 and subsequently decreased in 1998 to numbers below those of 1994. The 
number of intermediate level episodes per person did not show a clear pattern for 
either group, but the total number of days in intermediate care steadily increased for 
the non-ACT group from 94.6 days in 1994 to 172.8 days in 1998. No such pattern 
was evident in the ACT group, which had a peak of 215.5 days intermediate care in 
1997 immediately followed by a nadir of 157.7 days in 1998. The ACT clients used 
halfway house programs and IMDs consistently more than other clients, and 
substance abuse programs consistently less (despite their higher Target Cities contact 
rate). 
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Fewer members of the ACT group ultimately achieved stable, semi-permanent 
housing by 1998 than did those in the non-ACT group, although they were catching 
up. Initially. 16.7% of non-ACT clients and only 4.7% of ACT clients were known to 
be in a stable living situation., but by the end of the study, 55.8% of non-ACT clients 
and 47.6% of ACT clients found a permanent or semipermanent home. Each year 
from 1994 through 1998 (except 1996), a higher proportion of ACT clients were 
homeless than were non-ACT clients, while those ACT clients who did achieve stable 
housing were commonly placed in board and care homes. Non ACT clients were 
often placed in supported housing. 
Table 3 
ACT Subpopulation 
IN ACT NOT IN ACT 
Year % Eligible Clients % Eligible Clients 
with Episode with Episode 
Acute Care Episodes 
94 70.0 62.5 
95 77.6 75.4 
96 83.0 79.8 
97 60.4 44.4 
98 57.3 31.4 
Intermediate Care Episodes 
94 74.4 33.3 
95 65.3 44.6 
96 96.2 75.8 
97 79.3 28.9 
98 62.3 16.1 
Permanent Episodes 
94 4.7 16.7 
95 10.2 29.2 
96 32.1 44.4 
97 35.9 50.0 
98 47.6 55.8 
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Figure 4 
Permanent Level of Care 
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Substance Abusers 
Demographically, the substance abusers had a lower average age and a higher 
proportion of males than did nonusers (See Appendix). Both of the transgender 
individuals were also substance abusers. All of clients ever victimized and almost 
90% of those ever arrested were also in this category, as were all of the clients 
admitted to Napa and almost all of the clients with any periods of homelessness. 
A similar proportion of both groups, substance abusers and nonusers, used 
acute services prior to 1998, but the substance abusers' total number of days in acute 
care was consistently lower each year except 1997. Prior to 1998, substance abusers 
were more frequent users of emergency services than nonusers, although both groups 
used inpatient services in similar proportions. In 1998, usage patterns seemed to 
change for the substance abusers: the proportion of this group using both emergency 
and inpatient services dropped, and the number of emergency room episodes per 
person dropped as well. Intermediate levels of care were consistently used by higher 
proportions of substance abusers than nonusers, but the nonusers had longer average 
lengths of stay and higher total number of days in this level of care, except in 1998. A 
far higher proportion of nonusers spent time in IMDs, while a far lower proportion of 
this group stayed in halfway houses. As the study period evolved, substance abusers 
had progressively longer lengths of stay in residential and substance abuse facilities. 
Far fewer dually diagnosed clients achieved stable, permanent housing than 
did nonusers, and this was consistently reflected by much higher rates of 
homelessness for the users. They had much higher rates of placement in supportive 
housing, while their nonusing counterparts had higher rates of placement in board and 
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care homes; rates of independent living/living with family were similar for both 
groups. 
Table 4 
Substance Abuse Subpopulation 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE NO SUBSTANCES 
Year % Eligible Clients % Eligible Clients with 
with Episode Episode 
Acute Care Episodes 
94 66.7 64.0 
95 77.4 73.3 
96 80.4 82.5 
97 49.5 52.5 
98 35.2 58.1 
Intermediate Care Episodes 
94 54.6 48.0 
95 56.0 46.7 
96 83.9 80.0 
97 49.5 42.5 
98 36.5 30.1 
Permanent Episodes 
94 7.6 20 
95 19.1 26.7 
96 36.6 50 
97 41.7 52.5 
98 48 63.6 
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Transients 
The transient clients did not differ greatly from the nontransienis in terms of 
age, sex, arrest rates, or assault rates. Slightly more transients were substance abusers 
than nontransients (not statistically significant), and a slightly higher proportion of 
transient substance abusers had contact with Target Cities workers than nontransients. 
In general, the transients cost the mental health system less money and used less acute 
care resources than nontransients. 
The proportion of transients using acute services was higher than that of 
nontransients in 1994, 1995, and 1996. After 1996, the opposite was true - a lower 
proportion of transients used acute services. Both transients and nontransients had 
reductions in usage of acute services over the course of the study, but the reductions 
were much greater in the case of the transients. The total number of inpatient days 
was much smaller for the transients each year, although the average length of stay per 
hospitalization was only dramatically lower in 1998. In the crisis year of 1996, 
transients used emergency services much more than nontransients and much more 
than was typical of their overall average usage rate. The nontransients, on the other 
hand, did not show as marked an increase in usage of acute services during this time. 
Intermediate care facilities housed a higher proportion of transients, but their 
average lengths of stay and total number of days were shorter than for nontransients. 
Stable, long term residence was achieved by a higher proportion of the transients, 
who were more likely to be placed in supportive housing and less likely to be placed 
in board and care homes than nontransients. 

Table 5 
Transient Subpopulation 
STABLE TRANSIENTS 
Year % Eligible Clients % Eligible Clients 
with Episode with Episode 
Acute Care Episodes 
94 65.1 75.0 
95 72.3 87.1 
96 74.7 88 4 
97 51.8 48.3 
98 48.2 31.0 
Intermediate Care Episodes 
94 51.8 62.5 
95 54.2 51.6 
96 79.5 87.0 
97 49.4 45.0 
98 38.3 28.5 
Permanent Episodes 
94 9.6 25.0 
95 18.1 29.0 
96 41.0 39.1 
97 42.2 48.3 
98 50.5 55.7 
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Medicare Recipients 
Medicare recipients averaged an older age than their non-Medicare 
counterparts, had a slightly higher percentage of females, and average a lower cost 
per client in all years except 1998 (see Table 6). They were less likely to be arrested, 
and although their proportion of substance abusers was roughly equal to that of 
nonMedicare clients, they were much less likely to be contacted by Target Cities. No 
Medicare clients were jailed during the study, and their rates of homelessness were 
much lower than those of nonMedicare clients during 1995, 1996, and 1997, the years 
of the crisis period. 
Data on usage of acute services by Medicare recipients must be examined 
with caution, because incomplete information exists about their hospitalizations in 
private facilities. Nevertheless, the data is rich enough to draw some tentative 
conclusions. In general. Medicare recipients used less acute services than did their 
non-Medicare counterparts. Non-Medicare clients had more episodes of inpatient and 
emergency care per person, and a higher total proportion of MediCal clients used 
acute services than did Medicare clients.. The total number of inpatient days was 
higher for non-Medicare clients, but after implementation of MediCal inpatient 
consolidation in January 1995, average length of stay became comparatively higher 
for Medicare clients than for MediCal clients.* 
Similar percentages of MediCal and Medicare clients used intermediate care 
services over the 5 years studied, but MediCal clients consistently had more episodes 
* Indigent clients are considered MediCal clients for the purposes of this discussion, since both they and MediCal 
clients are managed similarly by the county. 
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per person than Medicare clients. A smaller percentage of Medicare clients stayed in 
substance abuse programs, but no other obvious trends emerged in terms of 
placement differences. Of those living in halfway houses. Medicare clients 
consistently had higher average lengths of stay. 
Permanent, stable residences were achieved by 50% of each group by the end 
of the study. The proportion of Medicare recipients in supportive housing was double 
that of the non-Medicare recipients while a slightly lower proportion of Medicare 
recipients lived in board and care homes than did nonMedicare recipients. 
Table 6 
Medicare Subpopulation 
MEDICARE NO MEDICARE 
Year % Eligible Clients % Eligible Clients 
with Episode with Episode 
Acute Care Episodes 
94 71.9 62.7 
95 75.0 77.1 
96 79.7 81.7 
97 41.4 56.4 
98 31.9 48.3 
Intermediate Care Episodes 
94 62.7 54.2 
95 77.1 54.3 
96 81.7 81.7 
97 56.4 47.0 
98 48.3 37.5 
Permanent Episodes 
94 6.3 13.6 
95 18.2 22.9 
96 44.1 37.0 
97 48.3 424 
98 52.5 52.5 
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Discussion 
In general, San Francisco mental health seems to have successfully shifted its 
focus from acute to long term care for the chronically mentally ill without a 
subsequent increase in use of crisis services, jail services, or homelessness. Overall 
usage of acute care was successfully decreased, and recidivism seems to have 
decreased as well, because a smaller percentage of the population required 
hospitalization by the end of the study. Among those who continued to use inpatient 
services, however, the average number of episodes per patient was not reduced. 
Similarly, although the average length of each hospitalization and total number of 
inpatient days actually increased during the study, the decreased proportion of people 
using inpatient services after 1996 probably meant that many less acutely ill clients 
were no longer being hospitalized. As a result, many shorter lengths of stay would be 
removed from calculation of the average. Prior to 1996, increases in lengths of stay 
may have indicated that patients' clinical conditions were worsening. (During the 
same time period, the average length of stay for all psychiatric hospitalization 
decreased, so these patients deviated from the system-wide average.) Also, as more 
clients moved into the intermediate care system and filled available beds, longer 
lengths of hospital stays may have meant that increasing gridlock in the housing 
system prevented clients from being discharged in a timely manner. 
The intermediate care system evidenced changes more difficult to interpret. 
As predicted, more clients used these services in 1996 and 1997, but by the end of the 
study, no clear long-term pattern had yet emerged. The fact that approximately two 
episodes per person remained a fairly constant number throughout the study may 

59 
indicate that stays in two progressively less acute facilities are needed to transition 
patients back to more independent living conditions. Among intermediate level 
programs, the decreasing length of stay at IMDs is important to note, because it may 
mean that the system is successfully transitioning clients back to the community more 
rapidly. This would support the decision made to eliminate 80 IMD beds upon the 
opening of the city's Rehab Facility. Also noteworthy among intermediate level 
facilities is the increase in the average length of stay in halfway houses and substance 
abuse programs after 1996. This may be a short term finding, related to recovery from 
the crises of 1996, or it may represent a longer term trend, because facilities are better 
meeting patients' needs with an increased emphasis on integrating mental health and 
substance abuse. 
A large proportion of the sample achieved stable, long term housing by 1998, 
further supporting the hypothesis that managed care would efficiently shepherd the 
system's transition to a less acute, more chronic focus. The increasing use of board 
and care homes to house the sample population represents an effective expansion of 
an existing resource. It may be that many chronically mentally ill people need this 
type of support and structure to live successfully in the community. Supported 
housing, which had an initial increase in usage in 1996, ultimately did not contribute 
as much to stable housing than did board and care homes. Given supported housing's 
rehabilitative focus, this may mean that people successfully transitioned to 
independent living after a one to two year stay in these facilities. On the other hand, 
these numbers may also mean that clients could not successfully complete a stay at 
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supported housing because it was too independent and unstructured for their level of 
functioning. 
Trends in homelessness and jail time are difficult to interpret, given that most 
people had a large amount of unknown time in the first three years of the study. The 
data should therefore be viewed with some skepticism, as the actual values for 
homelessness and jail time are probably much higher than those recorded in the 
study's early years. In later years, as data collection improved, the amount of 
unknown time and number of people involved diminished greatly. 
Subpopulations 
The functional status of the various subpopulations in the study could often be 
appraised based upon the type of facility in which they were placed. Higher 
functional status was associated with the use of community-based facilities with a 
focus on rehabilitation and reintegration into the community, whereas lower 
functional status was associated with institutions more concerned with creating a 
stable, secure environment for their residents. Short term, acute measures sometimes 
did not differentiate between two subpopulations, and varying levels of severity only 
became apparent during more stable periods. IMDs and board and care facilities 
tended to be used for lower functioning individuals, whereas the opposite was true of 
supported housing, substance abuse facilities and halfway houses. 
The data on ACT clients indicate a long-term propensity for higher acuity and 
lower functional ability. In the crisis year of 1996, both ACT and non-ACT clients 
used similar amounts of acute care, but in the years afterwards, the use of acute 
services declined rapidly for the non-ACT clients. Chronically, the ACT clients 
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consistently displayed lower levels of functioning, with higher rates of homelessness, 
lower rates of stable housing, and a higher likelihood of being placed in a board and 
care home. ACT clients may be less willing than others to agree with and work 
towards a treatment plan. This would help to explain their inability to achieve stable 
housing despite the best efforts of the ACT staff, who actively attempt to find 
housing for their clients. This might also help explain their low use of substance 
abuse programs, despite their high Target Cities contact rate. On the other hand, 
mental illness may play a more prominent role in the ACT clients pathology, and thus 
they may need programs more oriented towards mental health than substance abuse. 
Dually diagnosed clients in the sample seem to have a greater potential for 
functional independence than the non-substance users. Their number of days in acute 
care was lower than that of the non-substance users, and they were more likely to use 
the "higher functioning" intermediate and permanent care facilities. They did, 
however, have higher rates of homelessness. Interestingly, in 1998, usage patterns 
changed for the substance abusers: the proportion of this group using both emergency 
and inpatient services dropped, and the number of emergency room episodes per 
person dropped as well. These usage changes may be related to stricter gatekeeping 
standards for substance abusers and subsequent changes in the substance users' 
attitudes and behavior. For example, the substance abusers may have been less likely 
to go to the emergency room after a crack binge if they knew that they would not 
spend the night in the hospital. On the other hand, since many people are brought to 
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emergency services involuntarily, the 1998 reductions in usage may actually reflect 
clinical improvement and less need for involuntary interventions.* 
The subpopulation of transient individuals appear to be a higher functioning 
group than nontransients, although the two groups did not differ on any demographic 
variables other than a slight difference in rates of substance abuse. This may, in fact, 
be a reason for their transience, as they may be capable of long periods of time 
without psychiatric care. On the other hand, jail cannot be excluded as an equally 
good reason for their transience, even though their arrest rate was no different than 
the nontransients. The transient group was typically placed in programs with more 
independence and less restrictions, and eventually, a higher proportion of the group 
attained stable housing. Their average length of stay in halfway houses and substance 
abuse treatment programs grew progressively longer after 1995, perhaps indicating 
that their needs were better met by programs in the latter years of the study. Again, 
this may be due to the integration of dual diagnosis concepts into both mental health 
and substance abuse treatment programs. 
As predicted. Medicare clients functioned at a slightly higher level than 
nonMedicare clients, although it remains unclear whether this would be true if they 
were stripped of their additional financial and medical resources. No Medicare clients 
were jailed during the study, and they had much lower rates of homelessness. Both of 
these statistics may be related to the fact that Medicare recipients receive a larger 
monthly check (SSDI) than do MediCal recipients (SSI) and are therefore better able 
” The way to resolve this would be to assess whether the involuntary admission status of substance abusers has 
changed over time. 
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to pay rent. Medicare clients were also much less likely to be contacted by T arget 
Cities, perhaps because DMS was not responsible for authorizing or paying for their 
hospitalizations. 
Future 
The future of mental health in San Francisco will depend upon effective 
management of several key areas: dual diagnosis, housing shortages, and data 
management. 
Clearly, much of the current success of the San Francisco managed care plan 
is due to reforms in the mental health housing system, including prioritizing the most 
expensive clients, the high users and severely mentally ill, and establishing central 
authority via the bed committee. The mental health housing supply is not unlimited, 
however, and many more clients need housing than can be provided. When the 
allocation of housing is determined by the cost of a client to the system, ethical 
questions jump to the fore. On the other hand, in an era of limited budgets, housing 
must be rationed to those most in need. A high use of services can demonstrate such a 
need, and cost can estimate service usage. 
The San Francisco mental health team has addressed this situation by 
allocating more resources for community based housing. When the Rehab Facility 
opened in 1997, 80 IMD beds were gradually closed and the clients were to be 
reintegrated into the community. Although the IMD beds were closed to create more 
money for residential care in San Francisco, the influx of 80 people into the 
community over a period of less than a year only served to compound the pressure 
felt by the housing system. To help alleviate this pressure, in 1997-98, 65 residential 
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care beds were added to the system and in 1998-99, 25 more beds will be added as 
well. This will create a total of 472 mental health beds in the city to serve what at last 
count was approximately 19,000 clients. 
Future plans for housing involve sharing funds with substance abuse, as 
discussed below, but minimal numbers of beds can be added unless more IMD slots 
are closed or another funding source is found. It is quite frustrating for staff members 
to cope with the limits of the system. As one person noted, "We seem to have the 
belief that residential care can work with these (more complicated) clients without 
more funding and enriched resources, and yet we often fund other levels of care that, 
while they provide benefits, do not seem to provide the lasting system benefit that 
residential care provides."67 
If reforms are successfully implemented, and use of costly acute care remains 
relatively low, then some additional resources may enter the system. For example, a 
recent study found that the 35% of Medicaid clients who were the heaviest users of 
inpatient services accounted for 75% of the total inpatient expenses. If it were 
possible to target these users and reduce their rates of recidivism, some money could 
be diverted to other parts of the system. This study shows that recidivism can be 
greatly reduced among the chronically mentally ill, which may mean that more 
resources will eventually become available for others. Unfortunately, the mental 
health system can never be secure that new budget cuts will not be introduced which 
would negate the savings mentioned above. 
The current system of treatment for dually diagnosed individuals has many 
more resources than it did at the beginning of managed care. A fairly high number of 
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new outpatient and inpatient programs for the dually diagnosed have been created, 
but the demand for services still remains much higher than the supply. Waiting lists 
of up to two months are common, and by the end of the waiting period, many people 
have disappeared or are using substances again. In addition, many programs require 
that clients have spent 30 days clean and sober prior to entrance, and clients have no 
access to facilities where they can go in the interim. 
Active substance abuse is associated with many of the negative consequences 
of mental illness - homelessness, arrest, assault, etc.- but we do not yet understand 
how best to help clients cope with this issue. In this study, residential substance abuse 
treatment programs were examined. These appear to be most used in times of crisis, 
but when individuals have recovered from the crisis, it is unclear whether continued 
substance abuse counseling is occurring, and if so, whether it is effective in 
preventing relapse. Research has shown that the process of quitting an addiction 
involves several stages of mental preparation, including the precontemplative, 
contemplative, action, and maintenance stages. In fact, mental progression towards 
the action phase of quitting drugs was associated with a significantly higher rate of 
stable housing in a study of homelessness among the dually diagnosed. 
The harm reduction model may be better able to meet the needs of some of the 
most chronic users of drugs and alcohol. This model takes the point of view that some 
reduction of substance abuse is better than nothing, and can actually lead eventually 
to abstinence. Currently, no facilities serving the dually diagnosed in San Francisco 
operate under a harm reduction model, but for clients evicted from the abstinence 
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based programs, this type of program may help them break their addiction while 
keeping them stably housed and out of crisis. 
A fairly new Twelve Steps Program called DRA (Dual Recovery 
Anonymous) may be a valuable addition to residential programs. It is designed to 
serve dually diagnosed clients who "need their medications, but are dependent on 
alcohol or other harmful substances"68 because traditional programs like AA often 
shun the use of any psychoactive substances, creating a dilemma for the mentally ill 
client who needs his/her drugs. The San Francisco chapter of the National Alliance 
for the Mentally Ill has begun to establish some DRA groups in the city, with the help 
of the head of the division of mental health. 
In 1996, during the study period, SSI and MediCal benefits were disallowed 
for anyone considered disabled due to an addiction. An intensive effort was begun by 
both mental health and substance abuse services to have all applicable substance 
abusers declared disabled due to mental illness so that these resources would not be 
lost. Initial analysis indicated that of a sample of 496 substance abusers studied who 
were to lose SSI, 282 met the criteria for mental illness and requalified for benefits, 
96 were rejected, and 118 were awaiting a decision. 
As a result of these changes, mental health and substance abuse administrators have 
developed a novel way to serve these new clients while maximizing revenues for both 
systems. Money allocated to substance abuse services from the city's General Fund 
could be leveraged to create dual diagnosis programs for MediCal clients by matching 
these dollars to federal MediCal funds. This plan was estimated to provide the 
departments with $700,000 of extra revenue in 1997-98 to be used for sorely needed 
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dual diagnosis treatment programs and to develop a case management team to tollow 
high cost users of both systems on a transitional basis. 
The broadened partnership between mental health and substance abuse is one 
example of the type of flexibility that can result from managed care. The ACTs are 
another example, being only a suggestion on paper until inpatient consolidation, the 
bed committee, and the high user reviews demonstrated that they were needed by the 
system to help manage its clients. Creative use of funds has occurred on a large scale, 
as demonstrated above, and also on a smaller scale. The Discharge Coordinator, a 
nurse who works with hospitals in planning for patients' discharges, has a "slush 
fund" allotted her so that she can pay for any necessary unbudgeted services, such as 
transporting an unreliable client to a treatment program upon discharge from the 
hospital. 
Several broader questions are left unanswered by this study. No one seems to 
know much acute care is appropriate in the case of the chronically mentally ill. 
Reductions in lengths of stay seem to have stabilized somewhat in San Francisco 
since the first year of inpatient consolidation. If length of stay is reduced any more, 
will clients decompensate and use more acute services? To whose standard of acute 
care should mental health systems compare themselves? 
The question of funding for mental health remains a critical one for San 
Francisco and all of California. A bill to cut the Vehicle Licensing Fee, which was 
increased in 1991 to fund Realignment, has just passed in the state legislature. 
Revenues from the tax are reserved for the use of cities and counties, representing 
25% of county revenues and 10% of city revenues.69 This tax cut will eliminate 
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approximately four billion dollars from the state coffers, leaving counties with no 
guaranteed source of funding for health care. 
A final question deals with the issue of community benefits: does a publicly 
funded mental health plan create benefits for the broader community outside the 
world of mental health? The San Francisco Plan seems to have accomplished some of 
this. It helped substance abusers who lost their SSI benefits regain services through 
mental health. It has advocated for affordable housing, an issue affecting the entire 
city, and provides support for consumers and their families via the Office of Self 
Help, an advocacy office located within the division's offices. Consumers of the 
system also work in the office, answering phones and running the 5th floor cafe. On a 
more grandiose level, since many of the division's clinical efforts involve clients who 
are homeless, if managed care could even help make a dent in the city's huge 
homeless problem, the city would be forever grateful. 
Methodological Issues 
Several problems became evident in the implementation of this study. First, 
more than half the time tracked in the first two years of the study was categorized as 
unknown. If it were known how this time was spent, some conclusions of the study 
might change. Second, the study drastically underestimated cost shifting by 
underestimating the amount of jail and homeless time, and by not counting any costs 
borne by the families of the mentally ill, who typically shoulder much of the burden 
caused by cost shifting. Third, the categorization of clients as substance abusers made 
no attempt to differentiate between active use and past use. This would have provided 
an interesting and perhaps more valuable set of subpopulations to compare. Also, 
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since outpatient care for substance abuse was not measured, the study undercounted 
the number of clients receiving substance abuse treatment, especially in the 
"post-crisis" years of 1997 and 1998 when aftercare treatment would be expected on 
an outpatient basis. 
The study lasted for 4 1/2 years, only 3 1/2 of which were considered to be 
managed care. A longer study period would have been more able to capture 
significant changes in the chronic data, including the possible loss of function among 
the schizophrenics. A longer time frame would also have captured the system's entire 
transformation to managed care, which was not yet complete at the end of the 
investigation. This study, therefore, describes the system at a crucial point in its 
transition, the watershed period when managed care is introduced and implemented. 
As noted earlier, rapid changes continually swept through the mental health 
system over the course of the study. Many of the changes attributed to managed care 
may, in fact, have been due to these other forces. Such developments as the cutting of 
SSI for substance abusers, the national overhaul of welfare programs, and the 
ongoing housing crisis among low income people in San Francisco which occurred 
during the study definitely had an impact upon the city's mentally ill. It remains 
unclear how much these changes influenced mental health policy and practice, and 
whether they were ultimately of more import than the presence of managed care. 
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Conclusions 
Since managed care's implementation in 1995, statistically significant changes 
have occurred in the proportion of SMI individuals using acute, intermediate, and 
permanent levels of care. Congruent with systemwide goals, less SMI patients are 
using acute and intermediate level services, and more are stably housed in permanent 
or semi-permanent settings. This shift seems to have occurred without immediate 
detrimental effect upon the clients affected, as their use of emergency services has 
continued to decline over the course of the study. Whether these trends will continue 
remains unknown, and should be the subject of further investigation. Future research 
should also focus on the question of whether and how much of these changes are due 
to the consolidation of economic and administrative power wrought by managed care. 
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Appendices 
Summary Data 
1. Entire Sample 
2. Medicare Subpopulation 
3. Subpopulation Without Medicare 
4. Subpopulation In ACT 
5. Subpopulation Not in ACT 
6. Substance Abusing Subpopulation 
7. Non Substance Abusing Subpopulation 
8. Stable Subpopulation 
9. Transient Subpopulation 
Statistics: Statistically significant findings 
1. ACT/Non-ACT Comparisons. 1998 
ACT/Non-ACT Comparisons, 1994 
2. Stable/Transient Comparisons, 1998 
Medicare/No Medicare Comparisons, 1994 
Substance Abuse/No Substance Abuse Comparisons, 1998 

Entire Sample (n=i54) 
%Eliq Clients Ava # Episodes Ava total 
with Episode per Person #davs/vr 
Acute Care (hospital + Psych Emergency Services) 
94 65.93% 3.68 21.33 
95 76.32% 4.75 39.45 
96 80 92% 5 71 45 20 
97 50.35% 4.76 39.71 
98a 41.82% 3.69 26.30 
** 30 30% 2 88 22 98 
avg age 39.18 
male 93 60% 
female 59 38% 
trans 
gender 2 1% 
Psych Emergency Services ava LOS Ever 
94 63.74% 2.66 0.66 1.76 , 40 2t>% arrested 
95 64.91% 3.16 0.62 1.96 Ever 
96 72.37% 3.75 0.53 1.97 assaulted 75 49% 
97 46.15% 3.17 0.44 1.38 Ever 
98a 41.67% 2.67 0.33 0.87 abusing 
** 29.55% 2.05 0.33 0.67 substances 114 74% 
Hospitals ava LOS % of Ever Abusing 
94 42.86% 1.72 17.58 30.21 Substances contacted 
95 66.67% 2.36 18.37 43.28 by Target Cities 
96 75.00% 2.54 18.42 46.86 45% 
97 37.76% 2.48 20.66 51.26 
98a 27.27% 1.90 23.27 44.26 
** 17.42% 1.52 25.51 38.83 
(IMDs, halfway houses, acute diversion units, 
miermeaiaie ware 
substance abuse residential treatment, detox) 
94 52.75% 2.08 156.06 
95 53 51% 2.23 137 77 
96 82.89% 2.26 117.42 Total Ava cost 
97 47.55% 2.18 183.83 #Eliaible per vear 
98a 34.64% 1.71 161.82 94 91 $27,849 
** 27.27% 1.36 106.73 95 114 $42,543 
(board & care, supported housing, 96 152 $52,819 
Permanent Residence jndep living, living with family) 97 143 $42,049 
94 10.99% 1.00 323.17 98a 132 $25,388 
** 132 $12,694 
95 21.05% 1.00 261.08 
96 40.13% 1.08 169.76 
97 44.76% 1.16 272.25 
98a 52.50% 1.08 312.66 
** 50.00% 1.08 161.93 
Note: These figures denote the actual results for the first half of 1998 prior to correction for annualization. 

Medicare Recipients 
%Eliq Clients Avq # Episodes Avq total 
with Episode per Person #davs/vr 
Acute Care (hospital + Psych Emergency Services) 
94 71.88% 3.22 15.65 
95 75.00% 4.12 36.33 
96 79.66% 4.91 41.49 
97 41.38% 3.67 28.17 
98a 31.85% 2.58 14.52 
** 23.08% 2.00 12.67 
(n=59) 
avg age 41.27 
male 34 58% 
female 24 41% 
trans 1 2% gender 
Psych Emergency Services ava LOS Ever 
94 71.88% 2.30 0.58 1.35 . tJ 14Vo arrested 
95 70.45% 2.87 0.63 1.81 Ever 
96 71.19% 3.36 0.47 1.57 assaulted 27 46% 
97 37.93% 2.68 0.41 1.09 Ever 
98a 32.69% 1.95 0.33 0.65 abusing 
** 23.08% 1.50 0.33 0.50 substances 45 76% 
Hospitals ava LOS % of Ever Abusing 
94 40.63% 1.62 15.67 25.31 Substances contacted 
95 59.09% 1.81 24.32 43.96 by Target Cities 
96 76.27% 2.00 20.93 41.87 38% 
97 27.59% 1.81 22.48 40.75 
98a 11.54% 1.88 22.19 41.61 
** 7.69% 1.50 24.33 36.50 
(IMDs, halfway houses, acute diversion units, 
mierviieaiaie vdic 
substance abuse residential treatment, detox) 
94 50.00% 1.69 168.80 
95 52.27% 2.22 123.08 
96 84.75% 2.06 120.76 Total Avq cost 
97 48.28% 2.07 173.79 #Eligible per vear 
98a 29.31% 1.30 184.85 94 32 $28,452 
** 23.08% 1.06 124.50 95 44 $39,980 
(board & care, supported housing, 96 59 $49,495 
Permanent Residence jndep living, living with family) 97 58 $37,139 
94 6.25% 1.00 229.00 98a 52 $25,314 
** 52 $12,657 
95 18.18% 1.00 232.00 
96 44.07% 1.08 171.00 
97 48.28% 1.21 286.50 
98a 52.50% 1.12 328.28 
** 50.00% 1.12 168.81 
Note: These figures denote the actual results for the first half of 1998 prior to correction for annualization. 

No Medicare (MediCal or No Insurance) (n=95) 
%Eliq Clients Avq # Episodes Avq total 
with Episode per Person #davs/vr 
Acute Care (hospital + Psych Emergency Services) 
94 62.71% 3.97 24.86 
95 77.14% 5.13 41.35 
96 81.72% 6.20 47.49 
97 56.47% 5.31 45.48 
98a 48.30% 4.17 31.34 
** 35.00% 3.25 27.39 
avg age 37.87 
male 59 62% 
female 35 37% 
trans 
gender 1 1% 
Psych Emergency Services ava LOS Ever _ ^ 
94 59.32% 2.89 0.70 2.03 . ' 32 34% arrested 
95 61.43% 3.37 0.61 2.07 Ever 
96 73.12% 3.99 0.56 2.22 assaulted 48 51% 
97 51.76% 3.41 0.45 1.52 Ever 
98a 47.50% 2.99 0.32 0.96 abusing 
** 33.75% 2.30 0.32 0.74 substances 65) 73% 
Hospitals ava LOS % of Ever Abusing 
94 44.07% 1.77 18.46 32.65 Substances contacted 
95 71.43% 2.64 16.26 42.92 by Target Cities 
96 74.19% 2.90 17.29 50.12 49% 
97 44.71% 2.76 20.15 55.68 
98a j7.50% 1.91 23.49 44.82 
** 23.75% 1.53 25.76 39.32 
(IMDs, halfway houses, acute diversion units, 
miermeuiaie vai6 
substance abuse residential treatment, detox) 
94 54.24% 2.28 148.56 
95 54.29% 2.24 146.95 
96 81.72% 2.39 115.30 Total Ava cost 
97 47.06% 2.25 190.76 #Eliqible oer vear 
98a 38.10% 1.92 150.76 94 59 $27,532 
** 30.00% 1.50 98.20 95 70 $44,145 
(board & care, supported housing, 96 93 $54,848 
Permanent Residence jndep living, living with family) 97 85 $45,266 
94 13.56% 1.00 342.00 98a 80 $25,433 
** 80 $12,717 
95 22.86% 1.00 275.63 
96 37.63% 1.09 168.89 
97 42.35% 1.11 261.46 
98a 52.50% 1.05 303.00 
** 50.00% 1.05 157.67 
Note. These figures denote the actual results for the first half of 1998 prior to correction for annualization. 

In ACT (n=54) 
%E!ia Clients Ava # Episodes Ava total 
with Episode per Person #davs/vr 
Acute Care (hospital + Psych Emergency Services) 
94 69.77% 4.43 30.00 
95 77.55% 6.74 58.97 
96 83 02% 664 56 27 
97 60.38% 6.16 54.56 
98a 57.28% 4.90 31.36 
** 41.51% 3.82 27.36 
avg age 38.09 
male 30 56% 
female 24 44% 
trans 
gender 0 0% 
Psych Emergency Services ava LOS Ever 
94 65.12% 3.11 0.67 2.07 ' ‘ 16 30% arrested 
95 67.35% 4.48 0.63 2.81 Ever 
96 81.13% 4.09 0.51 2.07 assaulted 27 50% 
97 56.60% 3.90 0.45 1.77 Ever 
98a 54.72% 3.53 0.40 1.42 abusing 
** 39.62% 2.71 0.40 1.10 substances 37 69% 
Hospitals ava LOS % of Ever Abusing 
94 55.81% 1.92 18.30 35.08 Substances contacted 
95 71.43% 3.09 19.92 61 46 by Target Cities 
96 77.36% 2.83 20.58 58.22 59% 
97 47.17% 3.20 21.16 67.72 
98a 47.17% 2.11 19.56 41.25 
** 30.19% 1.69 21.44 36.19 
(IMDs, halfway houses, acute diversion units, 
miemieaiaie vdiG 
substance abuse residential treatment, detox) 
94 74.42% 2.34 195.15 
95 65 31% 269 17970 
96 96.23% 2.41 158.96 Total Ava cost 
97 79.25% 2.19 215.49 #Eliqible per vear 
98a 62.30% 1.59 157.74 94 43 $39,835 
** 49.06% 1.31 100.67 95 49 $63,464 
(board & care, supported housing, 96 53 $69,057 
Permanent Residence mdep living, living with family) 97 53 $67,153 
94 4.65% 1.00 356.67 98a 53 $38,998 
** 53 $19,499 
95 10.20% 1.00 241.80 
96 32.08% 1.06 125.29 
97 35.85% 1.26 248.63 
98a 47.55% 1.08 273.90 
** 45.28% 1.08 139.75 
Note: These figures denote the actual results for the first half of 1998 prior to correction for annualization. 

Not in ACT (n=ioo) 
%Eliq Clients Ava # Episodes Ava total 
with Episode per Person #davs/vr 
Acute Care (hospital + Psych Emergency Services) 
94 62.50% 2.93 12.67 
95 75.38% 3.20 24.31 
96 79 80% 5.19 39 03 
97 44.44% 3.65 27.83 
98a 31.44% 2.22 20.10 
** 22.78% 1.72 17.61 
avg age 39.76 
male 63 63% 
female 35 35% 
trans 
gender 2 2% 
Psych Emergency Services ava LOS Ever 
94 62.50% 2.23 0.66 1.47 '' 24 24% arrested 
95 63.08% 2.10 0.62 1.29 Ever 
96 67.68% 3.52 0.54 1.91 assaulted 48 48% 
97 40.00% 2.56 0.41 1.06 Ever 
98a 31.65% 1.66 0.13 0.22 abusing 
** 22.78% 1.28 0.13 0.17 substances 77 77% 
Hospitals ava LOS % of Ever Abusing 
94 31.25% 1.40 16.00 22.40 Substances contacted 
95 63.08% 1.73 16.03 27.76 by Target Cities 
96 73.74% 2.38 16.98 40.48 38% 
97 32.22% 1.86 19.91 37.07 
98a 13.92% 1.43 35.80 51.14 
** 8.86% 1.14 39.25 44.86 
(IMDs, halfway houses, acute diversion units, imemieaiaie ware 
substance abuse residential treatment, detox) 
94 33.33% 1.56 94.62 
95 44.62% 1.72 94.53 
96 75.76% 2.16 90.26 Total Ava cost 
97 28.89% 2.15 135.21 #Eligible per vear 
98a 16.08% 2.03 172.82 94 48 $17,086 
** 12.66% 1.50 123.10 95 65 $26,931 
(board & care, supported housing, 96 99 $43,962 
Permanent Residence indep living, living with family) 97 90 $26,987 
94 16.67% 1.00 312.00 98a 79 $15,842 
** 79 $7,921 
95 29.23% 1.00 266.16 
96 44.44% 1.09 186.20 
97 50.00% 1.11 282.00 
98a 55.82% 1.07 333.81 
** 53.16% 1.07 174.02 
Note: These figures denote the actual results for the first half of 1998 prior to correction for annualization. 

No Substance Abuse (n=40) 
%Elia Clients Ava # Episodes Ava total 
with Episode per Person #davs/vr avg age 42.80 
Acute Care (hospital + Psych Emergency Services) 
male 22 55% 
94 64.00% 3.06 30.88 
95 73.33% 4.00 50.95 female 18 45% 
96 82.50% 5 82 59 73 
trans 
gender 0 0% 
97 52.50% 4.57 39.67 
98a 58.11% 4.89 48.38 
** 42 11% 3 81 42 31 
Psych Emergency Services ava LOS Ever _ __ 
94 56.00% 2.21 0.71 1.57 - t> 137o arrested 
95 63.33% 2.53 0.60 1.53 Ever 
96 77.50% 3.65 0.59 2.16 assaulted 0 0% 
97 52.50% 2.86 0.47 1.33 Ever 
98a 57.89% 3.25 0.35 1.14 abusing 
** 42.11% 2.50 0.35 0.88 substances 0 0% 
Hospitals ava LOS % of Ever Abusing 
94 48.00% 1.50 26.22 39.33 Substances contacted 
95 70.00% 1.90 27.30 52.00 by Target Cities 
96 82.50% 2.39 24.10 57.70 7 
97 35.00% 2.57 22.36 57.50 
98a 55.26% 2.02 28.79 58.14 
** 34.21% 1.62 31.57 51.00 
(IMDs, halfway houses, acute diversion units, 
miemieaiaie ware 
substance abuse residential treatment, detox) 
94 48.00% 1.75 196.25 
95 4667% 1.79 221 29 
96 80.00% 1.84 137.66 Total Ava cost 
97 42.50% 1.82 218.24 #Eliaible per vear 
98a 30.08% 1.12 139.82 94 25 $33,666 
** 23.68% 1.00 87.78 95 30 $50,544 
(board & care, supported housing, 96 40 $64,418 
Permanent Residence jndep living, living with family) 97 40 $48,644 
94 20.00% 1.00 284.33 98a 38 $30,489 
** 38 $15,244 
95 26.67% 1.00 270.63 
96 50.00% 1.00 175.73 
97 52.50% 1.05 294.45 
98a 63.55% 1.09 316.86 
** 60.53% 1.09 163.29 
Note: These figures denote the actual results for the first half of 1998 prior to correction for annualization. 

Substance Abuse (past or present) (n=ii4) 
%Eliq Clients Avq # Episodes Ava total 
with Episode per Person #davs/vr 
Acute Care (hospital + Psych Emergency Services) 
94 66.67% 3.91 17.86 
95 77.38% 5.00 35.55 
96 80 36% 567 39 87 
97 49.51% 4.84 39.73 
avg age 37.90 
male 71 62% 
female 41 36% 
trans 
gender 2 2% 
98a 35.23% 2.90 11.58 
** 25 53% 2 25 10 08 
Psych Emergency Services ava LOS 
94 66.67% 2.80 0.65 1.82 
95 65.48% 3.38 0.62 2.11 
96 70.54% 3.78 0.50 1.90 
97 43.69% 3.31 0.42 1.40 
98a 34.04% 2.26 0.30 0.68 
** 24.47% 1.74 0.30 0.52 
Hospitals ava LOS 
94 40.91% 1.81 14.41 26.15 
95 65.48% 2.53 15.81 39.95 
96 72.32% 2.60 16.29 42.44 
97 38.83% 2.45 20.03 49.08 
98a 17.02% 1.75 14.98 26.22 
** 10.64% 1.40 16.43 23.00 
Ever 
arrested 35 31% 
Ever 
assaulted 75 66% 
Ever 
abusing 
substances 114 100% 
% of Ever Abusing 
Substances contacted 
by Target Cities 
45% 
(IMDs, halfway houses, acute diversion units, 
iniGrrnGciiaiG ware 
substance abuse residential treatment, detox) 
94 54.55% 2.19 144.57 
95 55 95% 2 36 114 84 
96 83.93% 2.40 110.74 Total Ava cost 
87 49.51% 2.29 173.00 #Eliaible per vear 
98a 36.48% 1.91 168.89 94 66 $25,710 
** 28.72% 1.48 112.82 95 84 $39,784 
(board & care, supported housing, 96 112 $48,713 
Permanent Residence jndep living, living with family) 97 103 $39,513 
94 7.58% 1.00 362.00 98a 94 $23,303 
** 94 $11,652 
95 19.05% 1.00 256.31 
96 36.61% 1.12 166.56 
97 41.75% 1.21 260.88 
98a 48.03% 1.07 310.38 
** 45.74% 1.07 161.18 
Note: These figures denote the actual results for the first half of 1998 prior to correction for annualization. 

Stable Population (n=83) 
%EI>q Clients Avg # Episodes Avq total 
with Episode per Person #davs/vr 
Acute Care (hospital + Psych Emergency Services) 
3.78 
5.28 
5 50 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98a 
65.06% 
72.29% 
74.70% 
51.81% 
48.22% 
4.74 
4.08 
23.00 
44.25 
49 37 
41.93 
31.64 
avg age 39.72 
male 51 61% 
female 31 37% 
trans 
gender 1 1% 
** 34 94% 3 17 27 66 
Psych Emergency Services ava LOS Ever _ _ 
94 62.65% 2.69 0.69 1.85 ; ' 23 28% arrested 
95 61.45% 3.55 0.64 2.28 Ever 
96 68.67% 3.44 0.52 1.79 assaulted 38 46% 
97 45.78% 3.18 0.48 1.53 Ever 
98a 46.99% 2.97 0.33 0.98 abusing 
** 33.73% 2.29 0.33 0.75 substances 58 70% 
Hospitals ava LOS % of Ever Abusing 
94 44.58% 1.73 17.91 30.97 Substances contacted 
95 62.65% 2.62 18.68 48.87 by Target Cities 
96 67.47% 2.59 20.41 52.84 41% 
97 40.96% 2.44 21.02 51.32 
98a 32.53% 2.06 25.44 52.37 
** 20.48% 1.65 27.89 45.94 
(IMDs, halfway houses, acute diversion units, 
miermeaiaie uaiG 
substance abuse residential treatment, detox) 
94 51.81% 2.05 163.57 
95 54 22% 2 27 174 06 
96 79.52% 2.08 133.68 Total Ava cost 
97 49.40% 2.12 196.26 #Eliaible per vear 
98a 38.25% 1.48 167.10 94 83 $29,393 
A* 30.12% 1.24 106.56 95 83 $48,745 
(board & care, supported housing, 96 83 $55,437 
Permanent Residence jndep living, living with family) 97 83 $44,655 
94 9.64% 1.00 314 80 98a 83 $27,447 
** 83 $13,724 
95 18.07% 1.00 265.27 
96 40.96% 1.06 178.03 
97 42.17% 1.20 289.60 
98a 50.60% 1.08 311.17 
** 48.19% 1.08 160.98 
Note: These figures denote the actual results for the first half of 1998 prior to correction for annualization. 

Transient Population (n=7i) 
%Elia Clients Avq # Episodes Ava total 
with Episode per Person #davs/vr 
Acute Care (hospital + Psych Emergency Services) 
94 75.00% 2.83 6.33 
95 87.10% 3.56 28.78 
96 88 41% 5.92 40.95 
97 48.33% 4.79 36.41 
avg age 38.54 
male 42 59% 
female 28 39% 
trans 
gender 1 1% 
30.98% 2.69 12.20 
22 45% 2 09 10 64 
Psych Emergency Services ava LOS Ever 
94 75.00% 2.33 0.43 1.00 , 1 / Z4Vo arrested 
95 74.19% 2.30 0.55 1.26 Ever 
96 76.81% 4.08 0.53 2.17 assaulted 37 52% 
97 46.67% 3.14 0.38 1.18 Ever 
98a 30.61% 1.89 0.31 0.59 abusing 
** 22.45% 1.45 0.31 0.45 substances 56 79% 
Hospitals ava LOS % of Ever Abusing 
94 25.00% 1.50 10.67 16.00 Substances contacted 
95 77.42% 1.79 17.40 31.17 by Target Cities 
96 84.06% 2.50 16.43 41.09 48% 
97 33.33% 2.55 20.06 51.15 
98a 18.37% 1.46 14.59 21.28 
** 12.24% 1.17 16.00 18.67 
(IMDs, halfway houses, acute diversion units, intermediate V/di@ 
substance abuse residential treatment, detox) 
94 62.50% 2.40 105.57 
95 51.61% 2 13 35 29 
96 86.96% 2.47 99.30 Total Avq cost 
97 45.00% 2.26 165.83 #Eligible per vear 
98a 28.51% 2.24 150.81 94 8 $15,028 
** 22.45% 1.64 107.08 95 31 $27,403 
(board & care , supported housing, 96 69 $49,715 
Permanent Residence indep living, living with family) 97 60 $38,504 
94 25.00% 1.00 365.00 98a 49 $21,826 
** 49 $10,913 
95 29.03% 1.00 254.11 
96 39.13% 1.11 159.43 
97 48.33% 1.10 252.00 
98a 55.71% 1.08 314.80 
** 53.06% 1.08 163.29 
Note: These figures denote the actual results for the first half of 1998 prior to correction for annualization. 

ACT/Non-ACT Comparisons (X2 statistic) 
Statistically Significant findings 
1998 
% In Acute Care uncorrected 
Chi-Sq 
8.13 
p-value 
0.004 
Yates corrected 7.13 0.008 
% in Intermediate Level Care uncorrected 27.23 <0.000 
Yates corrected 25.31 <0.000 
% Using Psych Emergency uncorrected 6.98 0.008 
Yates corrected 6.06 0.013 
% Hospitalized uncorrected 16.23 <0.000 
Yates corrected 14.66 <0.000 
1994 
% in Intermediate Level Care uncorrected 
Chi-Sq 
20.81 
p-value 
<0.000 
Yates corrected 19.17 <0.000 
% in Permanent Residence uncorrected 3.98 0.046 
Yates corrected 2.98 not signif. 
% Hospitalized uncorrected 7.82 0.005 
Yates corrected 7.77 0.009 

Stable/Transient Comparisons (X“ statistic) 
Statistically Significant findings 
1998 
Chi-Sq p-value 
% In Acute Care 1998 uncorrected 3.92 0.047 
Yates corrected 3.23 not signif 
Medicare/No Medicare Comparisons (X2 statistic) 
Statistically Significant findings 
1994 
Chi-Sq p-value 
% Hospitalized 1994 uncorrected 10.71 0.001 
Yates corrected 9.44 0.002 
Substance Abuse/No Substance Abuse Comparisons (X2 statistic) 
Statistically Significant findings 
1998 
% In Acute Care 1998 uncorrected 
Chi-Sq 
5.78 
p-value 
0.016 
Yates corrected 4.88 0.027 
% Using Psych Emergency 1998 uncorrected 6.37 0.012 
Yates corrected 5.42 0.019 
% Hospitalized 1998 uncorrected 19.62 <0.000 
Yates corrected 9.44 <0.000 
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